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Abstract
International river basins have been studied from the perspective o f cooperation or 
conflict but have seldom been explored in the international relations literature in regards to 
what sort of drivers impact river degradation. This paper attempts to address this gap 
through the exploration o f the factors associated w ith river degradation. It tests hypotheses 
linking indicators of social conditions and river degradation in international rivers. Four 
environmental worldviews -  the Social Green, Market Liberal, Institutionalism and Bio­
environmentalism -- are used to  guide the selection of indicators o f possible social 
conditions that might cause river degradation. One hundred and eleven (111) river basins 
were selected and assigned a river degradation score using the biodiversity threat data 
generated by Vorosmarty et al. (2010). The data were analyzed using the Pearson 
correlation co-efficient. Statistically significant correlations were found between the 
independent variables of population density, treaty robustness and gross income, and river 
degradation (the dependent variable).
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Chapter 1
1.0 Introduction
The international relations (IR) literature has studied international river basins as 
sources of cooperation or conflict between states. Conflict and cooperation are understood 
as modes of interaction between states over water resources found in transboundary 
watersheds. Less often have scholars of IR chosen to approach international river basins 
from the perspective of river degradation and as a result have failed to provide much insight 
into what causes of river degradation. The concept of river degradation is difficult to define 
but fo r the purposes o f this study we will define river degradation based on the degree of 
threats posed to the biodiversity of a river as measured by Vordsmarty et al. (2010) in the 
leading paper "Global Threats to Human Water Security and River Biodiversity."1 This study 
attempts to address the issue of river degradation through the exploration of the drivers 
associated w ith poor river health. This fills a gap left by the more traditional approaches 
that looked at river basins through the lens o f how riverine resources are shared (or not) 
between states. Instead, we draw on a review o f the Green Theory literature to  develop a 
set o f possible indirect drivers o f environmental change w ith in international rivers. The 
Green Theory approach does not provide further insight into issues o f cooperation or 
conflict over rivers but instead treat rivers as important in their own right and tries to find 
ways to secure the health o f international rivers. Using recently compiled data on the
1 C. J. Vordsmarty et al, "Global Threats to  Human W ater Security and River Biodiversity," Nature  467  
(September 2010).
1
condition of river basins around the world we test for correlation between indicators 
associated with indirect drivers and the degradation of river basins. Given this is a 
preliminary study our hope is not to establish causation but only to  identify possible 
relationships that are worth further exploration.
1.1 The importance of rivers
Rivers can be thought of as the veins of life on planet earth. Water needs to be found 
in sufficient quality and quantity to enable life processes to occur. That being said, water is 
not distributed evenly across the planet. Twenty percent of the world's population lives in 
regions of no supply, 65% cope w ith low to moderate supplies and only 15% live in 
conditions of water abundance.2 Beyond the obvious link to  drinking water, numerous 
ecosystem services are provided by rivers. Every one o f the 9 billion people on the planet 
depends on healthy river habitat either directly or indirectly. Most of the world needs to 
develop strategies to deal w ith water related risk of some sort.
Moving past the anthropocentric viewpoint, river systems are ecosystems of 
incredible biodiversity. As of 2010, freshwater species represent 9.5% of all life on the 
planet and a full third of all known vertebrates.3 They live in an area that takes up just 0.8% 
of the earth's surface.4 As well as having a high number of species, freshwater ecosystems
2 World W ater Assessment Programme, The United Nations W orld W ater Development Report 4: Knowledge 
Base (Paris; UNESCO, 2012), 385.
3 David L. Strayer et al, "Freshwater Biodiversity Conservation: Recent Progress and Future Challenges," 
Journal o f the North American Benthological Society 29, no. 1 (2010): 346.
4 Ibid, 346.
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contain many species that belong exclusively to a particular place.5 The high diversity of 
species per area makes freshwater ecosystems biodiversity hotspots. Lastly, it should be 
noted that terrestrial species are freshwater dependent to some degree, which means that 
the effects o f heavily impacted rivers are fe lt beyond the banks o f rivers. When the quality 
and quantity of water is decreased then the health of a watershed declines. River 
degradation is an issue around the globe.
Given the unique importance of water to ecosystems and humans, having healthy 
rivers is critical to achieving a sustainable future. Sustainable development has been defined 
in the Brundtland report, "Our Common Future," as "development that meets the needs of 
the present w ithout compromising the ability of future generations to  meet the ir own 
needs."6 With rivers providing countless ecosystem services to humanity, the loss o f river 
function that we are now witnessing means that we are lim iting the services rivers can 
provide for future generations. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment has identified 
ecosystems services as falling into four categories; provisioning, supporting, regulating and 
cultural life categories. An example of provisioning is the fish provided fo r people from 
rivers. For example, the people o f Cambodia get between 60% and 80% of the ir protein 
from freshwater fish.7 In the support category is that of filtration of pollution w ith up to 80% 
of nitrates being removed from water that has moved through a wetland.8 The economic
5 Ibid, 346.
6 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), 43.
7 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Wetlands and W ater: Synthesis, 
(Washington: World Resources Institute, 2005), 1.
8 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Wetlands and W ater: Synthesis, 34.
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value of wetlands is estimated at $4.9 trillion US a year.9 In sum, rivers are critical to a 
healthy environment and a healthy environment is a key aspect o f sustainability.
1.2 The causes of the decline of river health
River habitat around the world is being impacted more than any other ecosystem on 
the planet.10 According to the Living Planet Index, freshwater biodiversity has declined in 
rivers and lakes 35% since 1970, a rate greater than that for either marine or terrestrial 
systems.11 On a global scale, Vordsmarty et al. (2010), found that "over 30 o f the 47 largest 
rivers, which collectively discharge half of global runoff to the oceans, show at least 
moderate threat levels."12 There is a desire to improve the situation; however, determining 
the primary causes o f river degradation is complex.
To help conceptualize and collate concepts the Driving-Forces-Pressure-State-lmpact- 
Response (DPSIR) framework proves useful. The DPSIR framework is illustrated in Figure 1.1
9 Robert Costanza et al, "The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital," Nature  387 (May, 
1997): 259.
10 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Global Biodiversity Outlook 3, (M ontreal, Quebec: 
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2010), 42.
n W W F-lntem ational, Living Planet Report 2010: Biodiversity, Biocapacity and Development, (Gland, 
Switzerland: W WF-lnternational, 2010), 15.
12 Ibid, 556.
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Figure 1.1
Illustration of the Drivers, Pressures, States, Impacts and Response 
framework from Walmsley (2002)
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To date most studies have focused on linking specific activities to specific impacts on 
particular rivers. Under the DPSIR framework, the type o f factors being explored would tend 
to fall into the "pressures" category in that they look at actions taking place w ith in a 
watershed that apply pressure to the state of a watershed. Postel et al. (2003) identified the 
top threats to river health as dam constructions, dike and levee constructions, excessive 
river diversions, draining of wetlands, deforestation and poor land uses, uncontrolled 
pollution, overharvesting, introduction of exotic species, releases of metals and acid-
forming pollutants to air and water, emissions of climate-altering air pollutants and
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population and consumption growth.13 As the science has improved, the list of possible 
activities which impact river health has grown. From the impacts of dams on the natural 
flow regime to the still unknown impacts of pharmaceuticals, the list of pressures continues 
to g row .14 Though there is a good understanding of the immediate pressures on rivers, this 
is not enough. There is a need to understand why these pressures exist. This requires 
looking at drivers.
The Millennium Assessment defines a driver as "any natural or human-induced factor 
that directly or indirectly causes a change in an ecosystem."15 Nelson (2006) clarifies: "A 
direct driver unequivocally influences ecosystem processes. An indirect driver operates 
more diffusely by altering one or more direct drivers."16 Direct drivers are important to 
identify in order to solve the environmental issues in rivers as they help to target the source 
of the problem rather than the symptoms.
The concept of potential drivers as it pertains to  global water issues is explored in 
Water Development Report 3, which applies a different definition of drivers than Waimsley 
(2002). In Report 3, the drivers are "a set of fundamental processes that are external to the 
water sector and that directly or indirectly co-determine the evolution of the water system 
in terms of the quality, quantity and spatial distribution o f the resource."17 Utilizing the
13 Sandra Postel and Brian Richter, Rivers fo r  Life: M anaging W ater fo r  People and Nature  (Washington: Island 
Press, 2003), 14-15.
14 N. LeRoy Poff et al, "The Natural Flow Regime: A Paradigm for River Conservation and Restoration," 
BioScience 47, no. 11 (December, 1997): 769-784.
15 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Our Human Planet, Summary fo r  
Decision Makers (Washington: Island Press, 2005), 98.
16Gerald C. Nelson et al, "Anthropogenic Drivers o f Ecosystem Change: an Overview," Ecology and Society 11, 
no. 2 (2006):1. Accessed March 14, 2012. h ttp ://w w w .eco logyandsociety .org /vo lll/iss2/art29/
17 W orld W ater Assessment Programme, The United Nations World W ater Development Report 3: W ater in a 
Changing World Report 3  (Paris: UNESCO, 2009), 26.
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DPSIR framework and Report 3's definition of drivers, it is possible to  identify a range of 
possible drivers that influence river degradation. Nelson (2006) has identified five broad 
categories of drivers: demographic, economic, socio-political, cultural and religious, 
scientific and technological. Where current IR studies into international rivers have tended 
to fall short is that they have focused on the socio-political drivers o f conditions in 
international river basins while overlooking some of the other potential drivers.
1.3 International rivers
Rivers that cross international boundaries drain about 45% of the world's surface and 
account for around 60% of the world's runoff.18 The influences of state sovereignty make 
the approaches to managing these rivers quite different from  those falling under the 
authority of one government. It is possible that the division o f authority between two or 
more states could result in less effective management of river degradation. For this reason, 
international rivers need to be treated as separate cases from rivers that fall entirely w ithin 
a given state, not that the potential drivers are entirely different, but rather because the 
problems need to be understood in the context of anarchy tha t prevails in relationships 
between states. This study looks for relationships between drivers and the degradation of 
international rivers.
To summarize: rivers are important contributors to both human well-being and 
biodiversity. The activities of humans are affecting river health. Taking action requires an 
understanding of the underlying drivers. The DPSIR framework provides means to help
18 Jerome Delli Priscoli and Aaron T. Wolf, M anaging and Transforming W ater Conflicts (New  York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 1.
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identify linkages between drivers and states and, therefore, identify a potential solution. 
However, international rivers need to be treated as separate cases due to the limited 
institutional governance available. This thesis aims to identify drivers that can be correlated 
w ith the state of river degradation in international rivers. It is understood that this does not 
prove causation but the hope is that it may identify relationships that are worth studying in 
more detail. As Green Theory results in a shift away from  state centric theorizing to  more 
ecologically informed theorizing, preliminary studies such as the one that follows, are 
necessary to help narrow areas of focus.
The rest of the thesis will be presented as follows. Chapter 2 suggests Green Theory as 
an appropriate perspective on river degradation in traditional approaches to  IR. Hypotheses 
are refined from the worldviews within Green Theory, proposing relationships between 
these drivers and river degradation. Conceptual variables for these drivers are identified. 
Chapter 3 presents the data for each of the conceptual variables. In Chapter 4, we test for 
correlations between the drivers and river degradation and present the results in graphical 
map and summary format. Finally, Chapter 5 reviews the main findings and expands on 
insights gained from my research.
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Chapter 2 Review of Literature
2.1 Theory
International river basins have been an issue of interest for IR scholars for some time. 
This interest arises out of the fact that IR scholars focus their academic work on factors that 
influence and are influenced by the relationship between states. Given river basins cross 
international boundaries and carry costs and benefits across said boundaries it is not 
surprising that international river basins fall within the sphere o f study for IR scholars. The 
following chapter reviews some of the dominant approaches to understanding the dynamics 
surrounding international river basins. These approaches are grouped into the categories of 
Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism. After pointing out that these approaches are more 
concerned with the nature of the relations between states than the condition of the river 
basins being studied, an alternative approach is suggested in the form of Green Theory. It is 
tenets of Green Theory that are then used to construct the approach taken in the rest of 
this study.
The relationship between neighbouring states when they share international river 
basins has become a topic of interest to IR scholars. This relationship has been mostly 
understood as occurring along a continuum of conflict and cooperation.19 Understanding 
the dynamic of this continuum in international river basins is a problem scholars have 
focused on for three decades.20 During this period, the debate has been dominated by the 
two main IR perspectives: Realism and Liberalism. Those writing from a Realist perspective
19 Jerome Delli Priscoli et al, Managing and Transforming W ater Conflicts, (New  York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 51.
20 D. LeMarquand, International Rivers: The Politics o f Cooperation, (Vancouver: W estwater Research Centre, 
University of British Colombia, 1977).
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tend to expect conflict over water resources. Among the Liberal perspectives exists a belief 
that law and institutions can move states towards a cooperative solution. The concern over 
cooperation or conflict between states has been the central viewpoint applied w ithin IR 
which will be explored in the next three sections of this chapter. It is important to 
acknowledge that the conflict/cooperation continuum is only one possible issue associated 
with the condition of a river. By focusing almost exclusively on this particular issue, scholars 
have overlooked a number o f other possible problems that might be linked to the 
degradation of international rivers. Thus, after looking at traditional IR approaches to 
understanding river degradation, we introduce some other possible problems by exploring 
concepts from Green Theory.
Recently, a wider range of approaches has been applied to water issues. 
Constructivism has arisen from w ithin the IR field as a relevant perspective to conduct 
research on international rivers. Influences from outside the IR field, such as ecology, have 
also begun to affect IR scholarly thinking providing inspiration to  novel approaches such as 
the Green Theory approach.
2.1.1 Realist concepts in international river research
IR was developed in the interwar period out of a concern fo r how to maintain a world 
peace that seemed so elusive.21 Realists attempt to explain how states interacted. Realism 
provides a power based explanation whereby states compete in a Hobbesian system of "all
21 Fred Halliday, "The Pertinence of International Relations," Political Studies 38 (1990): 503.
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against all" and whereby the balance o f power keeps wars from breaking out.22 The 
constant possibility of war meant that states always needed to be strategic in the ir actions. 
Morgenthau (1993) explained, "the political realist asks 'How does this policy affect the 
power of the nation?'"23 Furthermore, power needed to be understood not in absolute 
terms but in relation to other states, or as relative power.24 This perspective was very 
influential and early IR studies of environmental issues were influenced by Realism.
Drawing from a concern regarding the impacts of resource scarcity and the resulting 
probability of resource conflict, some of the early scholarship on water and rivers foresaw a 
future of wars over water. Stevis (2006), in his review of international environmental 
politics (IEP), found that environmental researchers of the 1970 era tended to be "colored 
by [IR's] implications for human conflict more than ... any intrinsic value ... on nature."25 
This concern over resource wars has been explored in the academic literature, with water 
being a common theme. For instance, Gleick's (1994) writing on water wars provides a good 
example of how a shortage o f resources is expected to lead to conflict.26 Thomas Homer- 
Dixon (1991) and Kent Butts (1997) are other scholars that made such arguments in the
22 Eric Laferrier and Peter J. Stoett, International Relations Theory and Ecological Though: Towards a Synthesis, 
(London: Routledge, 1999), 79.
23 Hans J. Morgenthue and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among Nations: Struggle fo r Power and Peace, 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 13.
24 Jack Donnelly, "Realism." In Theories o f International Relations, 3rd ed. Ed. Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, 
Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, M atthew  Paterson, Christian Ruew-Smit and Jacqui True, 29-54. (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.), 37.
25 Dimitris Stevis, "The Trajectory of the Study of International Environmental Politics," In International 
Environmental Politics, Michele M . Betsill, Kathryn Hochstetler, and Dimitris Stevis, 13-53. (New  York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2006.), 20.
26 Peter Gleick et al, "W ater, W ar and Peace in the Middle East," Environment 36, no. 3 (April 1994): 6-42.
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mid-1990s.27 The influence of Realism is fairly easy to pick out in these writings. In 
particular, Realists emphasize the importance o f anarchy and self-help leading states to 
pursue their own self-interest even if it was harmful to other states sharing a river basin. For 
Gleick (1994), water is politically or economically im portant when "ensuring access to water 
provides a justification for going to war, and water-supply systems can become a goal of 
m ilitary conquest."28 Aaron Wolfe (2003), and others have also explored the issue of water 
wars but they found historical evidence that water scarcity might not result in conflict.29 
Nonetheless the notion has entered the public discourse. The current Secretary-General of 
the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, warns that water scarcity may result in conflict.30 The 
Honey-Pot theory draws on a similar logic to reach a completely different conclusion of 
what causes resource wars. Indeed, the "so-called" Honey-Pot theory believes resource 
wars to be caused by an abundance of resources rather than the ir scarcity as states fight for 
control over that abundance and the wealth it brings.31 Regardless, it implies acting out of 
self-interest to secure resources despite the negative impacts on neighbouring states, which 
results in conflicts.
A more structural approach to the issue o f conflict is that of Neorealism. Original 
Neorealist thinking aimed to provide a parsimonious explanation of how states related to
27 Kent Hughes Butts, "The Strategic Importance o f W ater," Parameters 27 (Spring 1997): 65-83. And Thomas 
F. Homer-Dixon, "On The Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," International 
Security 16, no. 2 (1991): 76-116.
28 Peter Gleick, "W ater and Conflict: Fresh W ater Resources and International Security," International Security 
18, no. 1 (Summer, 1993): 84.
29 Wolf, Aaron T., et al, "International Waters: Identifying Basins at Risk," W ater Policy (2003): 30.
30 W orld W ater Assessment Programme, The United Nations World W ater Development Report 3, 30.
31 Indra de Soysa, "Filthy Rich, not Dirt Poor! How Nature Nurtures Civil Violence," in Handbook o f  Global 
Environmental Politics, ed. Peter Dauvergne, 149-166. (Northam pton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2005), 149-50.
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one another through a structure defined by units alike in purpose but differing in capacity.32 
As explained by Keohane (1986), Neorealists "abandoned reliance on the nature of human 
beings to account for discord and cooperation in world politics, but focused instead on the 
competitive anarchic nature of world politics as a whole."33 W ithin this anarchic structure, it 
is what Waltz (2004) refers to as the "distribution o f capacity" that determines the 
relationship of one state to another.34 If the material conditions of the environment are 
seen as playing a role in determining state capacity in some form, then the causal 
mechanisms leading to conflict play out by impacting the differentiation o f capacity. For 
example, when Homer-Dixon (1991) states:
"In these countries, a range of atmospheric, terrestrial, and aquatic 
environmental pressures w ill in tim e probably produce, either singly or in 
combination, four main, causally interrelated social effects: reduced agricultural 
production, economic decline, population displacement, and disruption of 
regular and legitimized social relations,"35 
he is not identifying individual drivers o f inter-state conflict but rather factors that alter 
state capacity. When the capacity of states is altered, so too is their ability to secure their 
position within a competitive world structure and it is the alteration of state capacity that 
Homer-Dixon identifies as leading to inter-state conflict. One arena in which this can play 
out is in the differentiation of capacity between states sharing a river basin.
32 Kenneth N. W altz, "The Anarchic Structure of W orld Politics," in Introduction to International Relations A 
Reader, ed. Axel Hulsemeyer and Julian Schofield, 14-34. (Boston: Pearson Custom Publishing, 2004) 22.
33 Robert 0 . Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study o f World Politics," In Neorealism and its Critics, ed. 
Robert o. Keohane, 1-26. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). 13.
34 Kenneth N. W altz, "The Anarchic Structure of W orld Politics," 22.
35Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute 
Conflict," International Security 16, no. 2 (1991): 79.
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The development of the structural approach known as hydro-hegemony explains 
cooperation in river basins as the projection of control power by dominant states in the 
basin.36 The hydro-hegemony approach was developed by Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner 
(2006), in an article called "Hydro-hegemony -  a framework for analysis o f trans-boundary 
water conflicts."37 In addition to hard and soft forms of power, some scholars from the 
hydro-hegemonist perspective have built upon the importance of geographic structure of 
river basins, one that has also been identified by other scholars such as LeMarquand (1977), 
Toset el al. (2000) and Dinar (2008).38 This work has looked at, fo r example, how upstream 
states are in a superior position to downstream states in regards to water allocation or 
hydropower provision. However, downstream states can be in an advantageous position on 
issues like anadromous fish migration. The issue of border forming rivers, meaning rivers 
that are used to demark international borders between states, have spawned a separate 
discussion about whether "fuzzy" borders created by shifting rivers, and thus shifting 
borders, are the primary sources of conflict.39 W ithin the hydro-politics field there has been 
research into the mechanisms that weak powers can use to offset the superior position of 
hydro-hegemony or counter-hegemony strategies.40 Such strategies comprise of issue
36 Jenny R. Kehl, "Hydropolitical Complexes and Asymmetrical Power: Conflict, Cooperation, and Governance 
of International River Systems," Journal o f World-Systems Research 17, no. 1 (2011):220.
37 M ark Zeitoun et al, "Hydro-hegemony -  a Framework for Analysis of Trans-boundary W ater Conflicts,"
W ater Policy 8 (2006): 435-460.
38 D. LeMarquand, International Rivers: The Politics o f Cooperation, (Vancouver: W estw ater Research, 1977).
H.P.W Toset et al, "Shared Rivers and Interstate Conflict, Political Geography 19 (2000): 971-96. Shlomi Dinar, 
International W ater Treaties: Negotiation and Cooperation along Transboundary Rivers, (N ew  York: Routledge, 
2008).
39 Nils P Gleditsch, et al, "Conflicts over Shared Rivers: Resource Scarcity of Fuzzy Boundaries?" Political 
Geography 25 (2006): 361-382.
40 M ark Zeitoun et al, "Hydro-hegemony -  a Framework for Analysis of Trans-boundary W ater Conflicts,"
W ater Policy 8 (2006): 454.
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linking and side payments.41 Issue linking is a strategy employed during negotiations and 
consists in linking one intractable issue to another loosely related but likely more widely 
supported issue. Side payments are another incentive strategy used by states sharing river 
basins to enact solutions that may favour one state more than another. Side payments can 
be either cash compensation or in-kind cost sharing to persuade other basin sharing states 
to take actions that might not be in the ir immediate interest. Realist approaches have little  
to say on how such incentives should be managed. However, Liberals tend to focus more on 
incentives management and implementation.
2.1.2 Liberalism concepts in international river research
Theorists that work within a Liberal framework draw on a different set of assumptions 
about human nature and the motivation of states. Where Realists point to the self- 
interested action of states or to structural theories of power, Liberals perceive states to be 
not enemies but rivals.42 As a result, competing states are likely to compromise when they 
do not fear imminent invasion by other states.43 Tradeoffs are explored by states shifting 
their concern to "maximizing their 'absolute gains'- an assessment o f their own welfare 
independent of their rivals...."44 An example of how this plays out in river basin 
management is the Columbia River treaty between Canada and the United States (US). The 
US gets the benefits of flood protection while Canada receives compensation for increased
41 Shlomi Dinar, International W ater Treaties.
42 Alexander W endt, Social Theory o f International Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
279.
43 Ibid.
44 Scott Burchiil, "Liberalism," 3rd ed. In Theories o f International Relations, Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, 
Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, and M atthew  Paterson, 55-83. (New  York: Palgrave M acM illan, 2005), 65.
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hydropower production capacity in the U.S.45 Liberals have made an important contribution 
in defining the necessary conditions to achieve positive outcomes.
Many studies on international rivers emerged out of the field of international law. 
Their work focused both on the evolution o f principles o f international law relative to river 
management and on situational applications of international law to solve water disputes.46 
International water law has developed from historical tension between the principles of 
absolute territorial sovereignty and absolute territorial integrity. Authors such as McCaffery 
(2001) have documented the process that led to the new principle o f lim ited territorial 
sovereignty.47 Scholars have also explored how international law is utilized by states that 
are involved in disputes over international river issues. For instance, McCaffery (2001) 
explores how the US claimed either the absolute territoria l sovereignty or absolute 
territorial integrity principles depending on whether they are the upstream or downstream 
state 48 In the case of absolute territoria l sovereignty states claim that they have the right to 
engage whatever actions they wish w ithin the boundaries o f the ir state. In contrast, when 
the principal of absolute territorial integrity is claimed states refer to their right to exist free 
of interference, including the damage of state property. Others, such as Ramoli (2007), 
have looked at how the United Nations Convention on the "Law of the Non-Navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses" (Watercourses Convention) has been integrated into
45 Eve Vogel, "Parcelling out the Watershed: The Recurring Consequences of Organising Columbia River 
Management within a Basin-Based Territory," W ater Alternatives 5, no. 1 (2012): 171.
46 Ariel Dinar et al, Bridges over W ater Understanding Transboundary W ater Conflict Negotiation and  
Cooperation, (Toh Tuck Link, Singapore: W orld Scientific Publishing Co., 2007), 30.
47 Owen McIntyre, Environmental Protection o f International Watercourses under International Law,
(Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007), 14.
48Stephen C. McCaffery, The Law o f International Watercourses Non-Navigational Use, (New  York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 137-138.
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regional agreements.49 McIntyre (2007) highlights in his review of the Watercourses 
Convention how the concept of limited territorial sovereignty only acknowledges tensions 
between competing claims of sovereignty and provides little guidance on how this tension 
should be addressed through the principles of equitable utilization and the obligation not to 
cause significant harm.50 It is in reducing the transaction costs associated w ith regularly 
trying to strike a balance between these two principles that institutions may help.
Liberals try to explain the cooperation that exists using a Liberal Institutionalist 
approach. Liberal Institutionalists argue that, "under conditions of interdependence, 
uncertainty, and high transaction costs, states actually need institutions ... to  facilitate 
cooperation."51 Where a single issue or even a few non-linked issues are at play, states are 
likely to deal with these issues in ad-hoc single agreements. The ad-hoc single agreements 
were the norm in early international river treaties w ith topics like navigation being the focus 
o f an individual treaty.52
As the knowledge about the linkages between water problems has increased there 
has been an increase in "issue density" w ithin the river basin.53 Issue density is identified by 
Robert Keohane (1982) as "the number and importance o f issues arising w ith in a given 
policy space."54 Keohane (1982) makes the case that "where issues density is high ... one 
substantive objective may well impinge on another and regimes will achieve economies of
49 Ariel Dinar et al, Bridges over Water, 32.
50 Owen McIntyre, Environmental Protection o f International Watercourses, 28.
51J. Timmons Roberts et al, "Who Ratifies Environmental Treaties and Why? Institutionalism, Structuralism  
and Participation by 192 Nations in 22 Treaties," Global Environmental Politics 4, no. 3 (2004): 26.
52 Ken Conca, et al, "Global Regime Formation of Complex Institution Building? The Principled Content of
International River Agreements," International Studies Quarterly 50 (2006): 268.
64 RobertO , Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," International Organization 36, no. 2 (Spring 
1982): 339.
54 Ibid.
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scale...."55 The "Integrated Water Resource Management" approach grew out of a similar 
logic that is "treating the river basin as one system allows optimized management and 
development" and can promote cooperation.56 Sadoff (2005) identifies four general 
categories of benefits that can be achieved through cooperation: benefits to  the health of 
the river, benefits from the river, reduced transaction costs because of the river, and 
increased benefits to riparian states beyond the river.57 These multiple benefits provide 
motivation to states to cooperate on shared river basins. Another benefit that arises from 
even the most limited forms of cooperation is information sharing. The sharing of 
information is beneficial in that it reduces the uncertainty associated w ith complex 
problems found in international river basins. The sharing of information also contributes to 
the building of trust between co-riparians.
2.1.3 Constructivist concepts in international river research
Constructivism focuses on the potential for ideas to influence the nature of 
cooperation and conflict. Constructivism has recently begun playing a significant role in 
international river research. If, as one famous phrase puts it, "anarchy is what states make 
of it"  then surely the space exists fo r international river basins to  be influenced by the ideas 
and interests of states.58 This approach to understanding international issues has also 
influenced scholars trying to  determine how the international system contributes to 
environmental degradation. Bernstein (2001) explores the evolution of norms through the
55 Ibid. 340.
56 Claudia W. Sadoff et al, "Cooperation on International Rivers: A Continuum for Securing and Sharing 
Benefits," W ater International 30, no. 4 (2005): 2.
57 Claudia W . Sadoff et al, "Cooperation on International Rivers," 2.
58 Alexander W endt, "Anarchy is w hat States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics," International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425.
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integration of new ideas w ith existing social structures as one possible explanation of how 
the international system creates and responds to environmental change.59 A similar 
approach is explored by Conca (2006) who analyzes principles found in international river 
treaties and whether a type of norm diffusion can be supported by principles being adopted 
in international river treaties.60 While Conca's (2006) research found little  support for the 
concept of norm diffusion in general, environmental consideration did appear to be an 
exception. "The principles o f environmental protection, consultation and peaceful dispute 
resolution are important exceptions to the larger pattern o f non-convergence."61 Overall, 
quantitative analysis of river basin agreements w ith a large number o f cases produced 
mixed results. The dichotomy of conflict and cooperation between states then is no longer 
as salient. Instead, conflict and cooperation co-occur in basins and between different 
parties where states only represents one party to be considered in the development of 
solutions.
While many concepts developed in IR such as balance of power, hegemony, 
institutions, regimes, epistemic communities and norm diffusion have been applied to 
explaining conflict and cooperation, few studies in IR explicitly link these concepts back to 
ecological conditions within rivers. More recently this situation has started to change, w ith 
work by Thomas Bernauer et al. (2010) as a recent example that looks at pollution in 
transboundary European waters.62 Pollution has also been a useful metric by which to
59 Steven Bernstein, The Compromise o f Liberal Environmentalism, (New  York: Columbia University Press,
2001), 214-215.
60 Ken Conca, et al, "Global Regime Formation," 264.
61 Ibid., 281.
62 Thomas Bernauer et al, "Is there an Environmental Version of the Kantian Peace? Insights from W ater 
Pollution in Europe," European Journal o f International Relations 16, no. 1 (2010): 77-102.
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assess the effectiveness of treaties and river basin organizations, an ongoing and 
challenging area of study.63 As the condition of many rivers continues to decline there is a 
need to embrace more of an ecologically informed thinking and less of constraints of state- 
centric thinking. This is the direction taken by the Green Theory.
2.1.4 Green Theory in IR as a source of alternative concepts
Consideration o f environmental health o f international rivers within IR has been very 
limited, as the focus has been driven by aspects of cooperation and conflict between 
parties. Green Theory provides an alternative for scholars wishing to consider 
environmental needs. There are three general principles adhered to by most Green 
Theorists; a commitment to ecocentrism, a belief in the concept of ecological limits and 
recognition of the importance of some form of decentralized decision making.64 The first 
principle, ecocentricism, has been defined as "based on an ecologically informed philosophy 
o f internal relatedness, according to which all organisms are not simply interrelated w ith 
the ir environment but also constituted by those very environmental interrelationships."65 
Adopting an ecocentric perspective helps to shift the focus o f study from the 
conflict/cooperation issue to that of ecological health in river basins.
The second principle, importance of ecological limits, states that the reasons for the 
rapid decline of species are rooted in the failure of humanity to  respect ecological limits in
63 Ines Dombrowsky, "Institutional Design and Regime Effectiveness in Transboundary River M anagem ent -  
the Elbe W ater Quality Regime," Hydrology and Earth Systems Sciences 12 (2008): 223-38.
64 M atthew  Paterson, "Green Politics," In Theories o f International Relations 3 rd Edition, ed. Scott Burchill, 
Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, M atthew  Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit and Jacqui True, 
235-257. (New  York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 237.
65 Robyn Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory: Towards an Ecocentric Approach (London: UCL 
Press, 1992), 49.
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our past relations w ith the natural world. The Limits to Growth’s thesis states that the 
"realization of the quantitative restraints of the world environment and o f the tragic 
consequences of an overshoot is essential to  the initiation of new forms of thinking that will 
lead to a fundamental revision of human behaviour and, by implication, of the entire fabric 
of present day society."66 Applying this thesis to international river basins makes it 
increasingly evident that the human use of water is transgressing the limits of water usage 
required to maintain independently existing ecological functions.67 The th ird  principle, 
bioregionalism, represents an often proposed solution to environmental issues of 
decentralizing decision making to a scale that makes ecological sense.68 The concept of 
bioregionalism is indeed a complex mixing of cultural and ecological elements that are 
important to Green theorists and bioregionalists arguing "that ecological societies should be 
organized with natural environmental features such as watersheds forming the boundaries 
between communities."69 If watersheds are to form such boundaries then understanding 
what drives the dynamics within and across watersheds is important for those attempting 
to govern these watersheds. The following section uses the DPSIR framework as a means to 
structure the exploration of possible drivers identified in different worldviews that are 
prominent within Green Theory.
2.2 Indirect drivers of change in international rivers
66 Donella Meadows, et al, The Limits to Growth (New  York: Universe Books, 1972), 190.
S7Janos J. Bogardi, et al, "W ater Security for a Planet under Pressure: Interconnected Challenges of a Changing 
World call for Sustainable Solutions," Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability (In Press) 4, no. 1 (2011): 
1-9. Accessed March 28, 2012. http://www.gwsp.org/fileadm in/docunnents news/Elsevier.pdf. 5
68 Paterson, "Green Politics," 243.
69 Paterson, "Green Politics," 243.
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The emerging field of Green Theory is fairly consistent in supporting the key concepts 
of ecocentrism, ecological limits and decentralized decision making. Starting from these 
shared views, perspectives quickly diverge as different scholars draw on the whole range of 
social theory when attempting to find new means of understanding our relationship w ith 
the planet. The DPSIR approach highlighted earlier in the thesis is a way to begin taking a 
systems based approach to studying change at a basin scale. By providing a framework that 
links drivers to localised impacts, it gives Green Theorists a way to link the big picture and 
some of the abstract thinking to decision making and managing every day impacts. Clapp 
and Dauvergne's (2005), Paths to a Green World provide the initial survey o f Green Theory 
thinking used to select indirect drivers. Clapp and Dauvergne (2005) identify "four main 
worldviews on global environmental change and its relationship to the global political 
economy: those of market liberals, institutionalists, bio-environmentalists and social 
greens."70 The worldviews are an attempt to  classify "arguments and theories that try  to 
explain global environmental change...."71 These explanations are very broad in scope and 
best categorized as indirect drivers w ithin the DPSIR framework. A number o f possible 
indirect drivers are selected from concepts identified within their summary o f the four 
worldviews. Our purpose is to  identify the drivers underlined by these theories to draw a 
number of hypotheses and test them for a correlation w ith the environmental state of given 
international river basins.
70Jennifer Clapp et al, Paths to a Green World The Political Economy o f The Global Environment, (Cambridge: 
The M IT Press, 2005), 2.
71 Ibid, 4.
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2.2.1 Indirect drivers associated with Market Liberal worldviews
Market Liberals believe that "the main drivers of environmental degradation ... are a 
lack of economic growth, poverty, distortions and failures of the market and bad policies."72 
One relationship that has been empirically demonstrated, at least in some cases, to support 
the importance of economic growth fo r addressing the problem of river degradation is the 
"Environmental Kuznets Curve" (EKC). First explored by Simon Kuznet in his studies of the 
relationship between income inequality and economic development in 1955, the EKC73 is an 
inverted U shaped curve expressing the idea that as economic wealth increases, 
environmental damage increases until a turning point is reached at which time the trend is 
reversed and the health of the environment becomes positively correlated w ith the 
economic wealth. This relationship has been demonstrated to apply both to water quality 
and industrial water use.74 Hence market liberals support the idea of economic growth as a 
driver of environmental condition.
Another potential driver identified from  the Market Liberal perspective is that of 
market failure. By definition, market failure results in an inefficient allocation of resources. 
Market failure in the case of international river basins can arise from a number of sources, 
such as the lack of complete information, the presence o f externalities or difficulties 
excluding other parties from utilizing a resource. In cases where one actor knows something
72 Ibid, 5.
73 Soumynananda Dinda, "Environmental Kuznets Curve Hypothesis: A Survey," Ecological Economics 49 
(2004): 432.
74 Krishna P. Paudel et al, "An Empirical Test of Environmental Kuznets Curve for W ater Pollution," 
Environmental and Resources Economics 31(2005): 346. And Shaofeng Jia et al, "Industrial W ater Use Kuznets 
Curve: Evidence from Industrialized Countries and Implications for Developing Countries," Journal o f  W ater 
Resources Planning and M anagem ent 132, no. 3, (May/June 2006): 190.
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about a resource that another actor does not there exists a lack o f complete inform ation.75 
An example is when an upstream state is aware of the pollutants dumped into a river and 
the downstream state assumes the river is unpolluted. If the receiving state was to find out 
that the polluting state deliberately hid the facts about pollution the trust between the two 
states would be eroded. To address such a possibility it may be necessary to set up a jo in t 
monitoring panel to share information on water quality. Monitoring might reveal another 
type o f market failure, externalities.
Externalities exist when the process of production creates outputs (either positive or 
negative) that are not incorporated into the price of production. A more precise definition 
of externality is "a cost or benefit that arises from production and falls on someone other 
than the producer, or a cost or a benefit that arises from consumption and fall on someone 
other than the consumer."76 Flood control may be a positive externality that arises as a 
secondary benefit of building hydroelectric dams. As an international river flows across 
state boundaries the benefits and cost associated with a given externality are transferred to 
other states as well. The degree to which states agree on compensation fo r such benefits 
can influence the extent of development that takes place on a shared river. There are 
numerous means of sharing costs through mechanisms formally set out in treaties, 
however, it is not always necessary for a state to commit to a treaty to enjoy the 
downstream benefits nor are upstream states always willing to  enter a treaty that would 
impose costs upon them. The difficulty excluding co-riparian states from the benefits and
75 George A. Akerlof, "The M arket for "Lemons" : Quality Uncertainty and the M arket Mechanism," The 
Quarterly Journal o f Economics 84, no. 3 (Aug, 1970): 489.
76 Robin Bade and Michael Parkin, Microeconomics: Canada in the Global Environment 6' ed. (Toronto:
Pearson Addison Wesley, 2006), 346.
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costs of investments on a shared river means that market mechanism may not always be 
the best means to manage river resources.
One means to address such failures is to  alter the rules governing distribution of 
resources from rivers so the distribution functions more like a free market. This has been 
attempted on the water front w ith statements such as principle four of the Dublin 
Statement on Water and Development (Dublin Statement) calling for water to be treated as 
an economic good.77 The discussion that led to the signing of the Dublin Statement has been 
described by Conca (2006) as "a seminal frame-shifting event" that moved the management 
of water firm ly into the realm of Integrated Water Resource Management.78 By declaring 
water an economic good the assumption is that market pressures will ensure the efficient 
distribution of water because of the desire on the part of private parties to implement full 
cost recovery. It is argued by those in favour o f this approach that the inability o f states to 
provide clean water and sanitation to their citizens demonstrates the need fo r greater 
engagement o f the private sector.79
Ultimately the notion of treating water as an economic good is about the means used 
to  make a choice about how to  allocate water. Is it better to allocate water based on a price 
signal or based on a command and control model? The Dublin Statement and similar 
statements that followed reflect the Market Liberals' preference for the use of price signals. 
Thus the indirect driver that is associated w ith Market Liberal thinking is the presence of 
government policy that is supportive o f a free market economy.
77 Vasudha Pangare, Ganesh Pangare, Viraj Shah, B.R. Neupane and P. Somasekhar Rao, Global Perspectives on 
Integrated W ater Resource M anagem ent: A Resource Kit, (New Delhi: Academic Foundation 2006), 27.
78 Conca, Governening W ater, 140.
79 Karen Bakker, "A Political Ecology of W ater Privatization," Studies in Political Economy 70 (Spring 2003): 41.
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2.2.2 Indirect drivers associated with Social Green worldviews
The argument that the market can solve the environmental problems of today does 
not hold water w ith a group of thinkers and activists identified by Clapp and Davergne 
(2005), as Social Greens. For Social Greens the cause of environmental degradation is 
"large-scale industrial life (some say global capitalism), which feeds exploitation (of labour, 
women, indigenous peoples, the poor, and the environment), and grossly unequal patterns 
of consumption."80 The influence of Marxism is apparent in this approach. Barry (2007) 
traces how the emancipatory goals of Marxism were blended with ecological concerns 
resulting in an understanding that "not only is it the poor who suffer from the inegalitarian 
distribution of ecological bads, but poverty and inequality are also causes o f global and local 
ecological degradation."81 While starting from a different theoretical position, the Social 
Greens' worldview engages in a form o f the environmental justice movement for which 
inequality is both the cause and consequence of the current global economic structure.82 
The challenge before the Social Greens is to find the means to overcome inequality. There is 
no clear consensus among Social Greens as to which means must be employed to  deliver 
equality, only that equality must come before sustainability can be realized.
The Social Greens do not see the market as a solution to environmental destruction 
and thus would not subscribe to the fourth principle of the Dublin Statement that "water 
has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic
80 Clapp et a 1,14.
81 John Barry, Environment and Social Theory, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2007), 161.
82 Clapp et a 1,13.
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good."83 Many Social Greens would even argue the opposite, tha t clean water is an essential 
right that must be met prior to all other goals of human wellbeing can be pursued.84 To take 
things even further the notion of the rights for nature have been developed by the Global 
Alliance for the Rights of Nature. Article 1.6 of the proposed Universal Declaration of Rights 
of Mother Earth states, "just as human beings have human rights, all other beings also have 
rights which are specific to their species of kind and appropriate for their role and function 
w ith in the communities w ith in which they exist."85 Furthermore Article 2 section l.e  
declares "the right to water as a source o f life ."85 As activist Maude Barlow (2010), has 
argued "the ecological health of the planet is intricately tied to  the need for a just system of 
water distribution," as "the hope that communities will cooperate in the restoration of their 
water systems when they are desperately poor and have no way of conserving or cleaning 
the limited sources they uses is a cruel fantasy."87 The reciprocal link between a healthy 
environment and respect for human wellbeing as expressed in the language of rights cannot 
be separated for Social Greens. One indicator adopted to try  and capture aspects of the 
Social Green's perspective is the Voice and Accountability (VA) indicator from the
g o
Governance M atter VI project.
S3Vansudha Pangare et al, Global Perspectives on Integrated W ater Resource M anagem ent A Resource Kit, 
(New  Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2006), 27.
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 39.
85 Council of Canadians, Universal Declaration o f the Rights o f  M other Earth in Does N ature Have Rights? 
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86 Ibid. 14
87 Ib id .8
88 Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi. Governance M atters VIII Aggregate and Individual 
Governance Indicators 1996-2008 Policy Research Working Paper 4978, Washington: The W orld Bank, 
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Another way to explore the issue of environmental justice raised by Social Greens is 
through the concept of child mortality rates in a basin. The World Health Organization has 
estimated that 3 million children a year die from water related illnesses.89 Furthermore, 
research has found a link between poverty rates and child m ortality.90 If the Social Greens' 
logic that environmental harms are linked to social injustice and the distribution of child 
mortality from water borne illness is linked to poverty then the argument can be made that 
those living in poverty stricken basins are more exposed to  pollution. The fact that 
diarrhoea is the second largest source of mortality for children under five supports such 
logic.91 The environmental conditions w ithin these basins would also be expected to be in 
poor condition. Furthermore, as less is spent on sanitation in poor regions of the world, 
increased levels of domestic pollution would also be entering the freshwater environment 
and will put other communities in the region at risk. To measure child mortality, the Infant 
Mortality Rate data developed by the Center for International Earth Science Information 
Network is used.92
A th ird way Social Greens look at the issue of injustice in the distribution of 
environmental harm is the concept o f corruption. Corruption can be understood as "abuse
83 Annette Pruss-Ustun et al, Safer Water, Better Health Costs, benefits and sustainability o f interventions to 
protect and promote health  (Geneva: W orld Health Organization, 2008), 12.
90 Cesar G. Victora, e t al, "Applying an Equity Lens to Child Health and M ortality: More of the Same is not 
Enough," Lancet 362 (2003): 233.
91 United Nations Children's Fund, Diarrhoea: Why Children are Still Dying and what can be Done, (UNICEF: 
New York, 2009), 7.
92 Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University; 2005 Global 
Subnational Infant Mortality Rates [dataset]. CIESIN, Palisades, NY, USA. Available at: 
http://www.ciesin.colum bia.edu/povm ap/ds_global.html [Accessed April 9 2012].
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of public power for private gain".93 Such abuse of power has been linked to environmental 
conditions at a country level by Morse (2006). Corruption impacts environmental conditions 
by overriding the protections put in place to maintain public goods or by preventing the 
development of such protections in the first place.94 Corruption is also linked to the 
concerns of the Social Greens because as the elite uses influence to capture access to 
resources, individuals and communities from the lower rungs o f the social hierarchy are 
denied access to these same resources, resulting in a process identified as resource capture. 
Welsch (2004) has looked at the impact of corruption on air and water pollution and 
concluded that the level of corruption does have a positive relationship w ith levels of 
pollution, particularly in lower income countries.95 To capture levels o f corruption at the 
river basin scale again requires adjusting national level data to river basin data. One source 
of relevant national level data is the Worldwide Governance Indicators developed by 
Kaufmann et al (2009).96
Arguably, the injustice imposed upon the disempowered by the corrupt acts through 
the weakening of institutions. The role o f institutions in protecting the environment is the 
focus of the Institutionalists.
93 Morse, S., "Is Corruption bad for Environmental Sustainability? A Cross-national Analysis," Ecology and  
Society 11, no 1. (2006): 22. [online] URL: h ttp ://w w w .eco lo g yan d so cie ty .o rg /vo lll/iss l/a rt22 /
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95 Ibid, 682.
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2.2.3 Indirect drivers associated with Institutionalist worldviews
Institutionalists believe a deficiency in governance impedes the realization of 
sustainability. "Institutionalists emphasize the need for stronger global institutions and 
norms as well as sufficient state and local capacity to constrain and direct the global political 
economy."97 With regard to  international water pollution or global ozone depletion, 
Institutionalists choose to draw lessons about the need for more effective regimes. In early 
scholarly works on regimes, Robert 0. Keohane (1982) identifies two important functions of 
regimes. "Regimes are ... important in providing established negotiating frameworks 
(reducing transaction costs) and in helping to coordinate actor expectations (improving the 
quality and quantity of information available to states)."98 With these functions in place, 
Institutionalists believe it is possible to overcome the barrier of self-interest and develop 
collectively the principles needed to obtain sustainability.99 According to Charles Darwin 
(1889), "If the misery o f our poor be caused not by the laws of nature, but by our 
institutions, great is our sin."100 Water activists with an Institutionalist worldview take 
Darwin's warning about the failure o f governance to heart.
Varady et al. (2008) identify, from  the early 1970's onwards, a shift in water 
governance towards a neoliberal form that resulted in emergence of an emphasis on 
concepts such as "sustainable development, public participation, transparency, privatization
97 Clapp et al, 7
98 Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," International Organization 3 6 , no. 2. 
(Spring 1982): 339.
99 Clapp et al, 227-228.
100 Charles Darwin, A naturalist's Voyage (London: John Murray, 1889), 596, quoted in Peter H. Gleick,"The 
human right to water," W ater Policy 1 (1998): 487.
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and decentralization."101 In order to enable the delivery of these values in an era o f limited 
government many different Global Water Initiatives emerged. These "can be broadly 
defined as the institutional frameworks, organizations, special events, and awareness- 
raising campaigns that focus on global water-resources management."102 According to 
Lindermann (2008), however, " it is at the river basin scale (rather than the global scale) 
where [the] greatest developments in cooperative water management are found."103 
Lindermann (200) identifies over 400 river basin treaties touching on issues such as dams 
and water pollution.104 It is the presence of these institutional frameworks, regimes and 
organizations that we attempt to measure through an indicator o f institutionalism.
2.2.4 Indirect drivers associated with Bio-environmentalist worldviews
Whereas Social Greens and Institutionalists see the struggle fo r sustainability as 
rooted in social aspects, Bio-environmentalists look at the problem through a more 
materialistic lens. Bio-environmentalists see overpopulation as a key driver for undermining 
sustainability. The attributes associated w ith this worldview by Clapp and Dauvergne (2005) 
are related to  the "human instinct to overfill ecological space, as seen by overpopulation, 
excessive economic growth, and overconsumption."105 This way of understanding 
environmental issues has its roots in Malthus (1826) famous work on the linkage between
101 Robert G. Varady et al, "Strengthening Global W ater Initiatives," Environment 50, no. 2 (2008): 21.
102 Ibid, 20.
103 Stefan Lindemann, "Understanding W ater Regime Formation -  A Research Framework with Lessons from  
Europe," Global Environmental Politics 8, no. 4 (November 2008): 117-18.
104 Ibid.
105 Clapp et al, Pg 14.
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population, poverty and the limited availability of resources.106 This logic has been reformed 
and updated as seen in publications such as The Limits to Growth and The Population 
Bomb.107 It has also resulted in attempts to define and measure limits, such as the popular 
ecological footprint concept developed by William Rees and Mathis Wackermagel (2009) to 
measure the amount of resources consumed by an individual living in different regions of 
the globe.108 The Bio-environmentalists perceive "the law of large numbers" as a physical 
fact and believe the way to achieve sustainability is to reduce the quantity o f the 
numbers.109 There are multiple means to achieve this such as reducing rates of consumption 
or utilizing design to make consumption more environmentally friendly but most often for 
Bio-environmentalists the issue tends to  come down to  the number of people occupying a 
particular region. Therefore Bio-environmentalists have been linked to controversial calls to 
control or even cap population numbers.110 The issue o f water fo r Bio-environmentalists has 
been a remarkably challenging one as it refers directly to the struggle to find a balance 
between resources for nature and resources for the growing populations on the planet. 
According to Frank Rijsberman (2006), "many countries in the arid areas of the world, 
particularly Central and West Asia and North Africa, are already close to, or below the 1,000
106 Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the Principle o f  Population, Or, A View of Its Past and Present Effects on 
Human Happiness: With an Inquiry Into Our Prospects Respecting the Future Removal Or M itigation o f the Evils 
which it Occasions, Volume 1 (London: John M urray, 1826).
107 Donella H. Meadows, The Limits to Growth; a  Report fo r  the Club o f Rome's Project on the Predicament o f  
Mankind, (New York: Universe Books, 1972) and Paul Ehrlich, The Population Bomb, (New  York: Ballantine 
Books, 1968).
108 A.Y. Hoekstra, "Human Appropriation of Natural Capital: A Comparison of Ecological Footprint and W ater 
Footprint Analysis," Ecological Economics 68 (2009): 1964.
109 Thomas L. Friedman, Hot, Flat, and Crowded: Why We Need a Green Revolution -  and How it can Renew  
America, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux), 91.
U0J. Kenneth Smail, "Confronting a Surfeit of People: Reducing Global Human Numbers to  Sustainable Levels 
An Essay on Population Two Centuries After Malthus," Environment, Development and Sustainability 4 (2002): 
21-50.
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m3/capita/year threshold."111 In these regions at the very least it seems like nature's needs 
must be sacrificed to meet human requirements. As population growth continues and new 
pressures such as a growing middle class as well as a recent turn to  bio-fuels emerges, there 
are even more incentives to extract water for irrigation.112 If it is the case that "basins 
where the current water use is already in conflict with [Environmental W ater Requirements] 
cover over 15 percent of the world land surface and are populated by over 1.4 billion people 
in tota l," the Bio-environmentalists have reasons to be concerned about the lim it of 
freshwater resources.113
To summarize the general hypothesis being explored in this thesis is that various 
social factors or drivers influence river water quality. The specific hypotheses to be tested 
are the following:
1) The river degradation score (where 0 represents good condition and 1 
represents poor condition) o f an international river will:
i) associate with the gross income in a nonlinear manner similar to  that predicted 
by the EKC (as suggested in the Market Liberal worldview literature)
ii) be negatively related to the free market policy score (as suggested in the Market 
Liberal worldview literature)
iii) be negatively related to the voice and accountability score (as suggested in the 
Social Green worldview literature)
111 Frank R. Rijsberman, "W ater Scarcity: Fact or Fiction?" Agricultural W ater M anagem ent 80 (2006) 10 [5-22]
112 W orld W ater Assessment Programme, The United Nations World W ater Development Report 4: Knowledge 
Base, 404.
113 Vladimir Smakhtin et al "A Pilot Global Assessment of Environmental W ater Requirements and Scarcity," 
W ater International 26, no. 3 (September 2004): 315.
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iv) be positively related to the average child m ortality rate (as suggested in the 
Social Green worldview literature)
v) be positively related to the corruption score (as suggested in the Social Green 
worldview literature)
vi) be negatively related to  the robustness of river basin treaties (as suggested in 
the Institutionalist worldview literature)
vii) be negatively related to  the government effectiveness score (as suggested in the 
Institutionalist worldview literature)
viii)be negatively related to the participation in international collaborative efforts (as 
suggested in the Institutionalist worldview literature)
ix) be positively related to the population density of a river basin (as suggested in 
the Bio-environmentalist worldview literature).
Rivers play an important role in the development of communities and regions. We 
rely on them for a range of goods and services some of which are essential to life. Around 
the world we are using rivers in a manner that is leading to the decline of the ir health and 
subsequently the services that rivers' provide. When rivers cross international boundaries 
the services are shared by these states. Given the long history o f conflict and cooperation 
between states, many IR scholars have studied international rivers through the lens of 
conflict and cooperation. The influence of conflict and cooperation has been, fo r IR scholars, 
the main explanation for what occurs in international river basins. While very important, a 
focus on conflict and cooperation may result in other drivers being overlooked. This thesis
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attempts to  explore some of those overlooked drivers drawing on the green worldviews 
discussed above. The chapter that follows goes into more detail about the selected drivers.
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Chapter 3 Methods
In order to test statistically possible relationships between drivers and river 
degradation, the unit of analysis and the independent and dependent variables require 
more detailed description. Furthermore, it is necessary to describe how scores are 
developed to capture the indicators at the river basin level. W ith the unit o f analysis and the 
variables fully identified, nine hypotheses are further refined. The general hypothesis being 
explored is that various social factors or drivers influence river degradation.
3.1 Data
Most of the data we use to measure the state of the independent variables is 
gathered and reported by states. The best compilation o f data on international river basins 
for the needs of this thesis is found in the Freshwater Transboundary Dispute Database 
(FTDD), and it is used to determine the total number of international river basins, the 
treaties in place for each of those river basins and the population numbers fo r each o f these 
river basins. The methods used to generate the population numbers in the FTDD are 
accurate only on basins 25,000 km2 or greater, therefore, all basins smaller than 25,000 km2 
were excluded from my research. This size was recommended by Yoffe (2001) as the 
smallest reasonable size for data on a 30 minute grid.114 The number o f international river 
basins to be investigated totalled 111.
The watershed boundaries fo r the 111 river basins selected for this study were drawn 
out of the HydroSHEDS dataset developed by the World W ildlife Fund (WWF) and US
114 Shira Yoffe, et al, "Use of 6IS for Analysis of Indicators o f Conflict and Cooperation over International 
Freshwater Resources," In Basins a t Risk: Conflict and Cooperation Over International Freshwater Resources, 
Shira B. Yoffe, 42-62. n.d. Accessed April 2, 2012. Available at http://www.transboundarywaters.orst. 
edu/projects/bar/BAR_chapter3.htm, 58.
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Geological Survey and can be accessed online at the HydroSHEDS site.115 We use the spatial 
mapping and analysis program ArcGIS 10 to work with the data. River basins greater than 
25,000 km2 were exported to a separate data-layer creating the spatial dataset of rivers 
used in this thesis. The global information systems software mapping company 
Environmental Systems Research Institute supplied background data-layer depicting world 
political boundaries as of 1992, was overlaid and all river basins intercepting a national 
border were selected and exported. This dataset was checked against the maps generated 
by the FTDD. Where large differences are seen in basin shape, we use a second dataset to 
generate the watershed boundary. In addition, because the HydroSHEDS dataset does not 
include rivers draining into the Arctic a second dataset is used. The second source is the 
Global Drainage Basin dataset developed by Masutomi et al. (2009), at the Center for Global 
Environmental Research.116 This second source of data on river basin boundaries is used to 
fill in data missing from the HydroSHEDS dataset. The final watershed boundaries dataset 
were edited to remove any river basins w ith incomplete data or rivers that do not term inate 
in the ocean or an inland lake.
3.2 Indicator for the dependent variable
To determine the river degradation score for each basin, we use the spatial data 
developed by Vorosmarty et al. (2010) in their assessment of global threats to human water
115 W WF and USGS, HydroSHEDS. Accessed April 2, 2012. http://hydrosheds.cr.usgs.gov/index.php.
116 Yuji Masutomi et al, "Development of Highly Accurate Global Polygonal Drainage Basin Data," Hydrological 
Processes 23, no. 4 (February 15, 2009) :572-584. Database online at 
http://www.cger.nies.go.jp/db/gdbd/edbd index e.html
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security and river biodiversity.117 The data combines 23 different indicators of the state o f 
river basins into a spatially referenced 30 minute grid. The indicators include information 
about catchment disturbance, pollution, water resource development and biotic factors. 
The assorted pressures are assigned weights associated with the degree of influence based 
on the mean of weights between 0 and 1 provided by the eight authors o f the report. Table 
3.1 provides a breakdown of the indicators from each o f these categories and associated 
weights recreated from Vorosmarty et al. (2010) supplementary information.118
Table 3.1
Summary of indicators of Riverine Health from Vorosmarty (2010)
Theme Theme Weight Pressure
Pressure
Weight
Catchment Disturbance 0.22 Cropland 0.31
Impervious Surfaces 0.25
Livestock Density 0.18
Wetland Disconnectivity 0.26
Pollution 0.28 Soil Salinisation 0.08
Nitrogen Loading 0.12
Phosphorous Loading 0.13
Mercury Deposition 0.05
Pesticide Loading 0.10
Sediment Loading 0.17
Organic Loading 0.15
Potential Acidification 0.09
Thermal Alteration 0.11
Water Resource 
Development
0.30 Dam Density 0.25
River Fragmentation 0.30
Consumptive Water Loss 0.22
Human Water Stress 0.04
Agricultural W ater Stress 0.07
117 Vorosmarty e t al, "Global Threats to Human W ater Security and River Biodiversity," Data online at 
http://w w w .riverthreat.net/data.htm l.
118 Vorosmarty et al, "Supplementary Information" online at http: / / w w w .riverthreat.net/data.htmI
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Flow Disruption 0.12
Biotic Factors 0.20 Percentage o f Non- 
Native Fishes
0.26
Number of Non-Native 
Fishes
0.21
Fishing Pressure 0.34
Aquaculture Pressure 0.19
Details on the method used to combine the 23 indicators into an index can be found 
in the supplementary information developed by Vorosmarty et al. (2010).119 The data for 
the biodiversity threats index in Ascii file format are available at the website Rivers in 
Crises.120 We convert the Ascii file to raster format using ArcGIS 10 with the value fo r each 
30' grid cell (approximately 3,600 km2 at the equator) being the biodiversity threat index 
score for that area. The international rivers data-layer described above was used to define 
the outline of the international river basins and the extent of calculations to be performed 
on the biodiversity threats index layer. We use the zonal statistics tool in ArcGIS 10 Spatial 
Analysis extension to  produce averaged scores for all the grid cells that fell w ith in a 
particular river basin boundary. We then use this score as a proxy for river degradation to 
measure the dependent variable.
3.3 Indicators for the independent variables
The final step before the hypotheses can be tested is to explain how scores at the 
river basin scale are developed for each of the independent variables. Some of the scores 
needed are generated from primary datasets while fo r others datasets adjustments are 
made to fit existing datasets developed for other research projects to the scale of a river
119 ii_-jIbid.
1 2 0,u : j
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basin. The generation of original scores will be discussed individually but the adjustments to 
existing data are treated as a group. The first score to be addressed is the Gross Income 
score.
To represent the concept of an EKC, we use the level o f income at the river basin 
scale. The income of people in international river basins is represented by the Gross 
National Income (GNI) per capita for the year 2000. The GNI was recently introduced by the 
World Bank to replace the measurement of the Gross National Product (GNP). The 
difference between the two measurements is significant in this new global age of 
transnational corporations. The GNI includes income for residents even if it is earned in 
another country.121 This varies from the more commonly used notion of the GNP which is 
defined as "the total value of all goods and services produced in an economy in a year."122 
The GNP is rooted in the territoria l state whereas the GNI "is gross domestic product plus 
net receipts of primary income (employee compensation and property income) from 
abroad." 123 The GNI is adjusted to make it applicable to the scale of an international river 
basin. This is done by multiplying the GNI per capita country level data (represented as Gi, 
G2, G3, etc.) by the country population per basin data as provided by the Transboundary 
Freshwater Dispute Database (represented as P17 P2, P3)124 and then averaging the resultant 
product by the total number of basin fragments (represented as nc) in the given 
international river basin (illustrated in the equation below).
121 World Bank Open Databank, [database online] http://data.woridbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD  
(accessed April 8 2012).
122 Peter H. Pearse, Introduction to Forestry Economics, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press,
1990), 9.
123 World Bank, The Little Green Data Book, (Washington: The W orld Bank, 2011), 236.
124 Aaron T., W o lfe ta l, Freshwater Transboundary Dispute Database, [database online] 
http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/index.php (accessed March 29, 2012).
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Gl= l G 1.2.3..*Pl.Z.i...
nc
Using this equation enables the calculation of the Gross Income (Gl) o f each international 
water basin.
We use the Voice and Accountability (VA) index to capture aspects of the Social Green 
perspective. The VA indicator is one of six governance indicators developed by the World 
Bank's Governance Matters project. The VA is used fo r "measuring the extent to which a 
country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom 
of expression, freedom of association, and a free media."125 The VA, like many of the 
indicators used in this thesis, is aggregated at the state level instead of at the river basin 
level. This scale mismatch was overcome by creating a weighted score for each international 
river basin that accounts for the population contributed by each country (represented as Ci, 
C2, C3, etc.) to the international river basin. For example, the Colorado River has populations 
from both the US and Mexico. The VA score fo r the US is 90 and the VA score fo r Mexico is 
55. Averaging the US and Mexico VA scores fo r the Colorado River results in a VA of 72. 
However, it is reasonable to expect the 606 million people living on the US side o f the 
international river basin have more influence on the condition of the Colorado River than 
the 17 million living on the Mexican side. Therefore, rather than using an average of the VA 
scores, we use the following equation to determine each international river basin VA 
weighted score:
125Daniel Kaufmann et al, "Governance M atters VI: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996- 
2006," World Bank WPS4280, 3.
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International River Basin VA = _____________ (Ci+C2+...)_____________
Total International River Basin 
Population
Another indicator we believe captures aspects of Social Green thinking is child 
mortality. Hence, we develop a child m ortality score using the infant m ortality rate grid 
generated by the Poverty Mapping Project of the Center for International Earth Science 
Information Network.126 The international river basins layer described above is used to set 
a boundary within which average child m ortality scores are generated. We use the 
international rivers data-layer to define the geographic extent of calculations to be 
performed on the rate of infant mortality layer. The zonal statistics tool in ArcGIS 10 Spatial 
Analysis extension is used to produce averaged scores o f all the grid cells that fell w ith in a 
particular river basin boundary. This score is used as the child mortality score.
Conca's (2006) work on principled agreements provided the foundation for the 
current analysis of river basin treaties. Owen McIntyre's (2007) review o f Environmental 
Protection o f International Watercourses under International Law provides clearer language 
and a broader scope of considerations to complement my analysis. Additionally, we include 
substantive concepts from the Integrated River Basin Management literature to increase 
the sensitivity of the index beyond the principles identified by McIntyre (2007). In total, we 
pick 12 categories the majority of which are taken from the United Nations Convention on 
the Law o f Non-Navigational Uses o f International Watercourses. The categories are as 
follows:
126 Poverty Mapping Project of the Center for International Earth Science Information N e tw o rk , [database 
online] http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/povmap/ds global.isp
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1. The existence of an actual agreement that refers to water issues (AGR);
2. The requirement to perform international environmental assessments (IEA);
3. The requirement to exchange information (El);
4. The duty o f prior notification (PN);
5. The duty to warn (DW);
6. The establishment of a dispute resolution process or protocol (DRP);
7. The establishment of the need for regular meetings (RM);
8. The explicit statement of the desirability of cooperation (DC);
9. The requirement for training technical staff (TTS);
10. The establishment of a secretariat (SEC);
11. The set up of a basin level or country level commission (BC); and,
12. The establishment of jo in t technical teams (JTT).
We score a category as a 1 if it was referenced w ithin the treaty and a 0 if it was not. The 
score for each treaty is the sum of the categories. The degree of institutionalization for each 
of the international river basins is the sum of its associated treaties' scores. As Conca (2006) 
notes, most international river basin agreements tend to be bilateral, however, some 
multilateral agreements do exist.127 In such cases, we attribute the score of the multilateral 
agreement to each basin included in the multilateral agreement. An example of the scoring 
system for the Danube is found in Table 3.2.
127 Conca et al, "Global Regime Formation," 268.
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Table 3.2
Example ranking of treaties for a basin
Danube River AGR IEA RM El PN DW DRP DC TTS SEC JTT BC Total
Treaty A 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2
Treaty B 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 4
Treaty C 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Treaty D 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 8
Treaty E 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3
Treaty F 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 5
Treaty G 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12
Treaty H 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 6
Treaty 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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To determine population density for each of the river basin we utilize the totals 
developed by Yoffe (2001). Yoffe's (2001) study utilized Landstat data and global 
information systems (GIS) spatial analysis tools to determine the population densities of 263 
international river basins.128 The lack of information o f some of these rivers has resulted in 
154 rivers covered by Yoffe (2001) not being included in this study.
Lastly, we average the indices developed for the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
project and the Environmental Sustainability Index that we use based on the national scores 
given to countries sharing basins. From the ESI we use the Participation in the International 
Collaborative Efforts index for 2000. From the Worldwide Governance Indicators besides 
the VA index, we select the Control of Corruption and Government Effectiveness and 
Regulatory Quality indices fo r 2000. While the Control of Corruption and Government 
Effectiveness are fairly accurate titles representing closely what they are measuring the title  
Regulatory Quality title  is somewhat deceptive. Regulatory Quality is defined as "capturing
128 Shira Yoffe, et al, "Use of GIS for Analysis of Indicators of Conflict and Cooperation over International 
Freshwater Resources," 55.
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perceptions of the ability o f the government to formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that permit and promote private sector development."129 To reflect better 
this interpretation of regulatory quality, we refer to  the score developed from this index as 
the Market Policy score. All combined, these indices and indicators provide a good coverage 
of the possible understandings of institutional capacity.
3.4 Statistical Approach
The first step of the analysis we perform is to use the Chart Builder tool from  SPSS 2.0 
to check the distribution of the river degradation score. We further analyse the score using 
the frequencies statistics tool to check for the skewness and kurtosis of the data associated 
with the variables. The data from each independent variable is mapped onto a scatter plot 
with the dependent variable looking for a linear or possibly a curvilinear relationship 
between the variables. Given that the data collected for all variables were interval level 
data, in cases where there appeared to be a linear relationship, the variables are further 
tested for correlation using the Pearson correlation co-efficient. The Pearson correlation co­
efficient is described by Rodgers et al. (1988), as "the mathematical formula that is still most 
commonly used to  measure correlations."130 The Pearson r, as it is also known, is designed 
to test for correlation between two integer type variables. We use the software package 
SPSS 2.0 to run the tests. In terms of statistical significance a p-value equal to or less than 
0.1 will be considered as indication o f a relationship worth exploring in further detail.
129 Daniel Kaufmann et al, The W orldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues 
(September 2010). World Bank Policy Research W orking Paper No. 5430. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn,com /abstract=1682130, 4 .
130 Joseph Lee Rodgers et al, "Thirteen Ways to Look a t the Correlation Coefficient," The American Statistician 
42, no. 1 (Feb, 1988): 60.
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The units of analysis we use are international river basins. In terms of defining an 
international river basin for the purpose of this thesis, we begin with Aaron W olf et al.:
"Roughly following the 1978 [United Nations Register of International Rivers] we 
define a 'river basin' as the area which contributes hydrologically (including both 
surface - and groundwater) to a first-order stream, which, in turn, is defined by 
its outlet to the ocean or to a terminal (closed) lake or inland sea. Thus, 'river 
basin' is synonymous w ith what is referred to  in the USA as a 'watershed' and in 
the UK as a 'catchment'. We define such a basin as 'international' if any 
perennial tributary crosses the political boundaries of two or more nations."131 
This is a very expansive definition of international rives and results in rivers not traditionally 
considered to  be transboundary such as the Fraser and the Mississippi being included in this 
study.
We place an additional size lim itation on the definition of an international river basin 
which reflects the challenges associated with the resolution o f data used fo r the indicators. 
Since the data used is aggregated to grids approximately 50 km2 a minimum basin size of 
25,000 km2 is selected to lim it the effect of grids along the border of a basin. The results 
from each of the tests are presented in the next chapter.
131 Aaron T. W olf, et al, "International River Basins of the W orld," W ater Resources Development 15, no. 4 
(1999): 389.
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Chapter 4 Empirical Results
4.1 Results
In this chapter we will mainly focus on the statistical results. More precisely we will 
explore whether our hypotheses were proven true, the signs of correlations and the ir 
significance. More in depth analysis and interpretations will fo llow  in the next chapter.
The distribution of the dependent variable for the 111 units of analyses is fairly 
normal. As illustrated in the histogram labelled as Figure 4.3 below, the mean score of the 
river degradation score was 0.6514 on a scale between 0 and 1. There were no cases that 
scored 0 and few cases that scored 1. The skewness score was -0.444 reflecting the majority 
o f the cases was to the right of 0.50. The computer software SPSS was used to generate the 
skewness and kurtosis score. The formula used to calculate skewness is found in figure 4.1. 
The formula used to calculate the kurtosis score is based on the formula in figure 4.1
Figure 4.1 Kurtosis and Skewness Formulas
W( W + \ ) M 4- 3 (  I V - ] ) A ^  
g l  ( f F - l ) (  W - 2 ) {  W - d ) ^
SPSS Kurtosis Formula
The kurtosis score for the dependent variable was -0.394. Looking at the histogram, it 
is evident that the shoulder to the left of the peak falls away more slowly than that to the 
right of the peak. The situation for the independent variables is more varied and none of the 
independent variables could be said to  be approaching normal distributions. Skewness and 
kurtosis scores for the independent variables are summarized in table 4.1.
w m 3
g l  ( W - 1 ) ( W - 2 ) S 3
SPSS Skewness Formula
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Table 4.1
Summary of Skewness and Kurtosis for Independent Variables
Independent Variable Skewness Kurtosis
Gross Income 9.084 88.929
Market Policy .484 -.861
Voice and Accountability .341 -1.152
Child Mortality .776 -.476
Corruption .850 -.526
Treaty Robustness 1.551 4.155
Government Effectiveness .902 -.574
Participation In International 
Collaborative Efforts
.510 -.934
Basin Population Density 3.131 13.174
With a kewness score of 9.084 for the gross income it is apparent that the data is 
highly skewed and by looking at figure 4.2 it becomes evident that the distribution of the 
data in no way approaches a normal bell curve. For the market policy variable the data is 
skewed to the left and has very fat tails perhaps indicating value in exploring two 
subpopulations. The VA indicator has a fairly fla t distribution resulting in very fat tails and a 
kurtosis score of -1.152. The child m ortality indicator was skewed towards the le ft which in 
this case was zero. Both the corruption indicator and the treaty robustness indicator where 
skewed to lower numbers thought the treaty robustness indicator did have quite a strong 
peak that resulted from the number o f parties that signed on to the RAMSAR convention. 
The government effectiveness indicator and participation in international agreements 
indicator are also skewed to the lower numbers and may also be showing indications of 
bimodal distribution. Finally the population density indicator is highly skewed to lower 
numbers w ith a significant peak at the lowest values. The fact that none of the independent 
variables approach a normal distribution means that a good deal o f uncertainty is
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introduced into the statistical outputs. As the statistical tools being used in this thesis are 
optimized to work with normally distributed data future work should investigate how the 
data for the independent data may be improved so that it better fits a normal distribution.
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Figure 4.2
Histograms for Independent Variables
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Figure 4.2 continued
Histograms for Independent Variables
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The gross income score is highly skewed with the vast majority o f basins having very 
low levels of gross income and a few have high levels o f gross income. The distribution of 
market friendly policy is far closer to normal though slightly negative in distribution. The VA
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score is fairly fla t in distribution. Basin level child mortality is highly skewed with the 
majority of basins having low levels of child m ortality and then a noticeable tapering off in 
the number of basins as the number of child mortalities increases. Levels of corruption at 
the basin level are slightly negatively skewed w ith the majority o f basins having lower level 
of corruption. Treaty robustness is also negatively skewed as most basins agreements tend 
to have few environmental provisions associated w ith them. On the other hand, the 
distribution o f government effectiveness seemed to have two distinct peaks w ith the larger 
number ranking lower on government effectiveness then a second peak that ranks higher 
on the government effectiveness indicator. The levels of participation in international 
collaborative efforts are quite normally distributed across the international basins. Finally 
population density was highly skewed w ith the vast majority of basins having a lower 
population density and w ith a few outliers having far larger numbers people. Overall, the 
dataset indicates a distribution of the dependent variable close enough to normal to  justify 
further the use of the Pearson correlation coefficient though the distribution o f some of the 
independent variables means there w ill be outlier effects in some of the analysis.
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Figure 4.3
Histogram of distribution of River Degradation Score
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Table 4.2
Summary of Skewness and Kurtosis for Dependent Variable
Skewness -.444
Kurtosis -.394
The scatter plot graphs in the remaining eight figures plot the dependent variable, 
river degradation, on the y-axes and the independent variables on the x-axes. In Figure 4.4, 
the relationship explored is between the gross income score, presented in this case on a 
LoglO scale, to enable better visual differentiation between the cases and river degradation 
as expressed in hypothesis 1. The scatter plot and associated best fit linear regression line 
indicate a positive relationship between the river degradation score and the gross income
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score. This is confirmed by the Pearson Correlation between these two variables which is 
0.228 and is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
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Figure 4.4
Gross Income plotted against River Degradation Score
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Testing hypothesis 2 regarding the relationship between the river degradation score 
and the market policy score, Figure 4.5 plots the basin scores for market policy along the x- 
axis. The relationship seems to be weakly positive w ith a fairly wide dispersal o f basins. This 
very weak fit results in a Pearson Correlation score of 0.140. This score was not statistically 
significant.
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Figure 4.5
Adjusted Market Policy plotted against River Degradation Score
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Hypothesis 3 was intended to explore the relationship between the river degradation 
score and VA score. Looking at the scatter plot in Figure 4.6, there does not appear to be
any correlation between these two variables. There is a lack of a relationship between these 
two variables with a Pearson Correlation of 0.062 and no finding o f statistical significance.
55
Figure 4.6
Voice and Accountability plotted against River Degradation Score
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When looking at the child m ortality score and how it relates to the river degradation 
score for hypothesis 4, the scatter plots indicate a negative relationship between child 
mortality score and river degradation score. Figure 4.7 indicates mortality rates are only 
weakly related; the results from the Pearson Correlation test show a weak and slightly 
negative correlation at -.181 and a nearly statistically significant result (at the .05 level).
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Figure 4.7
Child M ortality plotted against River Degradation Score
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For hypothesis 5, another weak but nearly significant relationship was found between 
the river degradation score and the independent variable -  the corruption score. The 
relationship between these two variables is positive; however, the Pearson Correlation 
score is very low at 0.087. The scatter plot graph in Figure 4.8 supports the findings of this 
statistical test. The Yukon, Alsek and Stikine rivers seem to be significant outliers in this 
particular test.
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Figure 4.8
Adjusted Corruption plotted against River Degradation Score
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The results for hypothesis 6 about the relationship between the river degradation 
score and treaty robustness produced a stronger relationship. As shown in Figure 4.9 the 
scatter plot graph illustrates a fairly strong relationship between these two variables. The 
slope of the line is strongly influenced by the outliers the Rhine and the Danube cases. 
Nonetheless the results do support the findings of a relationship w ith the Pearson 
Correlation score being 0.470 and is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. There would 
also be a fairly strong but somewhat different relationship if the Rhine and Danube cases
were to be omitted.
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Figure 4.9
Treaty Robustness plotted against River Degradation Score
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The government effectiveness variable (hypothesis 7) was only weakly related to river 
degradation. Again, in this case, the Yukon, Alsek and Stikine seem to be significant outliers 
as is the Torne, though to a lesser extent. It might have been possible to  see a curvilinear 
relationship in Figure 4.10 if it were not for the fact that most o f the river basins with the 
highest government effectiveness scores are from  the US and Canada. The results from the 
Pearson Coefficient test returned a score of 0.153 supporting the visual assessment of a lack 
of a linear relationship.
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Figure 4.10
Adjusted Government Effectiveness plotted against River
Degradation Score
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Somewhat surprising are the result for hypothesis 8. Given the strong relationship 
between treaty robustness and river degradation scores it is surprising that the level of 
participation in international environmental efforts does not have a strong relationship to  
river degradation scores. Looking at Figure 4.11, the relationship is weakly positive. The 
Yukon, Alsek and Stikine are outliers. This time the Torne again seems to be a borderline
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case. The Pearson Correlation for this test was 0.076. There were 10 cases missing for this 
independent variable so the total number of cases was 101.
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Figure 4.11
Adjusted Participation plotted against River Degradation Score
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The last relationship explored, hypothesis 9, was between basin population density 
and river degradation. The relationship was found to be positive and fairly strong. As can be 
seen from Figure 4.12, the distribution of population density is somewhat more condensed 
than some of the other independent variables. Most cases reflected the positive nature of 
the relationship but the Han Ganges and Rhine river basins are outliers. It is possible to 
imagine a curvilinear fit in this particular case but the significant number o f basins w ith low
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population but high degradation scores do not fit this curvilinear line. The relationship 
between population density and river degradation scores has a Pearson Correlation o f 0.484 
(statistically significant at the 0.01 level) making it the strongest relationship of all the 
variables tested.
Figure 4.12
Basin Population Density plotted against River Degradation Score
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In total, nine different hypotheses were explored and tested. Three of these tests 
indicated significant relationships though two the three were in directions opposite the 
expected results as based on the literature. Furthermore, the relationship between child
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m ortality and the river degradation score produced a negative relationship; this too was 
opposite to what was expected. Though this did not prove to be statistically significant it is 
worth exploring further. Table 4.3 summarizes the results found.
Table 4.3
Summary of Results
Hypothesis D ependent
V ariable
Independent
V ariable
W o rld v iew Relationship Pearson
R
Statistical
Significance
Hypothesis 1 River
degradation
Gross Income M a rke t Liberals Positive 0 .2 34 Significant at 
th e  0.05 level
Hypothesis 2 River
degradation
M arke t Policy M a rke t Liberals Positive 0 .062 N ot Significant
Hypothesis 3 River
degradation
Voice and 
Accountability
Social Greens Positive 0 .047 N ot Significant
Hypothesis 4 River
degradation
Child M orta lity Social Greens Negative -0 .181 N ot Significant
Hypothesis 5 River
degradation
Corruption Social Greens Positive 0 .083 Not Significant
Hypothesis 6 River
degradation
Treaty Robustness Institutionalist Positive 0 .4 97 Significant at 
th e  0 .01  level
Hypothesis 7 River
degradation
Governm ent
Effectiveness
Institutionalist Positive 0 .127 N ot Significant
Hypothesis 8 River
degradation
Participation In 
International 
Collaborative  
Efforts
Institutionalist Positive 0 .072 Not Significant
Hypothesis 9 River
degradation
Population Density B io-environm entalist Positive 0.489 Significant at 
th e  0 .01  level
There are a few outliers of interest including the rivers of northern Canada which are 
in healthy condition and potentially influenced a number of the tests. For treaty robustness 
the Rhine and the Danube are clear outliers that might have impacted the test. The Rhine, 
Ganges and Hans are outliers in the population density test. In the next chapter we consider 
the implications of the results in light o f the perspectives reviewed in the theory section.
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Chapter 5 Discussion and Conclusion
5.1 Discussion
Of the nine hypotheses tested only three returned results that were statistically 
significant. Those three were: hypothesis 1 related to  gross income; hypothesis 6 on 
robustness of river basin treaties; and hypothesis 9 regarding population density. While the 
relationships for hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 6 were statistically significant they were not in 
the predicted direction. In the following chapter we look first at the results that did not 
prove significant, secondly at results that were unexpected but significant and finally discuss 
in more detail the statistically significant results that produced the predicted relationship.
Hypotheses 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8 did not produce statistically significant results. Hypothesis 
2 proposing that the average river degradation score fo r a given international river basin 
will be negatively related to the market policy score failed to produce a significant 
relationship. For example, looking at Figure 4.5, it is clear that there is substantial variation 
in river condition across dyads shared by Canada and the US even though the basins have 
the same market policy score. The market policy score is meant to capture the degree to 
which market friendly policies prevail in a given basin. It is likely that this indicator needs 
refinement to capture development that relates directly to water utilization. For instance, a 
stated commitment to water privatization in a given basin might be an alternative worth 
looking at in more detail. This option was explored during the preliminary work fo r this 
thesis but was rejected because no global dataset currently exists. There are, however, a 
couple of studies that compile lists of countries' positions on water privatization in the 
"least developed countries" so it may be possible to develop a global data set. There are
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likely other water specific issues that could be linked to  marketization of water that may yet 
provide stronger relationships.
The second set of hypotheses, hypothesis 3, 4 and 5, looked at the issues from the 
perspective of Social Greens. Social Greens would expect that international basins w ith low 
levels of local empowerment world be in a worse condition than those that are home to 
powerful elites in the global community. None of the indicators tested show significant 
support for such a relationship. The results from hypothesis 3 and hypothesis 5 are slightly 
positively correlated but only marginally. Hypothesis 4 produced a negative correlation. 
Again, the result was not statistically significant but it was interesting that for at least the 
portion of the basins with child mortality rates higher than 750 per basin, there appears to 
be a negative correlation between child m ortality and river degradation scores. In fact, w ith 
the grouping of low population density-rivers, in the lower left of Figure 4.7 possibly 
skewing the data, it is possible to have a stronger relationship than what was captured in 
the statistical test. However, if an argument could be made fo r removing the group o f low 
population density-rivers as outliers from the test, then the negative relationship grows 
stronger. One possible explanation of the negative relationship between the river 
degradation score and child mortality could be that rivers in a better condition are less 
developed and therefore have a higher risk of child mortality. In Figure 5.1 there is support 
for the negative relationship between the river child m ortality and wealth in a particular 
basin. The link between economic development and child mortality in a basin was not 
tested in this study. This relationship should however be explored further given its 
important implications for Social Greens for whom one of the main issues is over people's
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right to develop both socially and economically.132 If healthy rivers are in fact under­
developed river systems that are resulting in high child m ortality rates, then the case for 
maintaining these rivers in natural conditions is much more difficu lt to make.
Hypothesis 8 looked at the degree of participation in international regimes and 
institutions of the countries sharing a basin. Institutionalists would argue that one way to 
address the tension between development and a healthy environment is to create a policy 
mechanism, such as a treaty to lim it water pollution emissions, which minimizes the impacts 
of development. The hypothesis that the more engaged states are in international regimes 
the healthier the rivers shared by those states would be did not produce the negative 
relationship predicted. Instead, the relationship was very weakly positive. The overall 
tendency of states to participate in international regimes would be expected to expose 
them to the normative values embedded within these regimes and therefore influence the 
behavior of these states. A possible explanation why no relationship was found is that 
international regimes may not, on the whole, contain norms consistent w ith environmental 
protection. A more specific analysis of existing regimes for environmental content may help 
in developing a better indicator.
Hypotheses 1 and 6 did produce significant but unexpected results. Hypothesis 1 
states that the average river degradation score for a given international river basin will be 
related to the gross income score in an inverse U shape where poor and wealthy river basins 
will be in good condition and medium income basins w ill be in degraded condition. Instead,
132 One field that this has been playing out is around the issue of climate change. See for instance Marcos A. 
Orellana, Climate Change and the Millennium Development Goals: The Right to  Development International 
Cooperation and the Clean Development Mechanism," International Journal on Human Rights 7, no. 12 (June 
2010): 145-171.
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the statistical test showed a positive relationship w ith the river degradation scores getting 
higher as gross income scores went up. There was no sign of wealthy basins being in an 
improved condition in this particular dataset. One possible reason for having a positive link 
between the decline of river health and increased amounts o f wealth w ith in a watershed 
might be simply explained by the choice made by some wealthy communities to  invest in 
fixing issues that emerge as inconveniences to daily life rather than investing the ir resources 
to fix the original cause, which is a healthy river basin. This logic is supported by 
Vorosmarty et al. (2010) as they found that "rich countries tolerate relatively high levels of 
ambient stressors, then reduce the ir negative impacts by treating symptoms instead of 
underlying causes o f incident threat."133 Recent efforts at river restoration in the US and 
Europe suggest that attitudes towards addressing river health may be changing and it would 
be worth re-examining the relationship in a few years.
133 Vorosmarty, 599
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Figure 5.1
Child M ortality Score Compared to Gross Income
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Institutionalists would argue that one way to address the tension between
development and a healthy environment is to create a mechanism to minimize or mitigate
the environmental impacts of development. Regimes and institutions house the mechanism
used to minimize or mitigate environmental impacts and so we looked at the relationship
between the condition of a river and the degree of participation in international regimes
and number o f institutions that the countries sharing a basin participated in (hypothesis 8).
No significant relationship was found. The relationship was very weakly positive as opposed
to an expected negative relationship. Hypothesis 6, on the other hand, produced one of the 
strongest relationships found and was one of three hypotheses to  return significant results.
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However, the results were the opposite o f what was hypothesized. Where bilateral and 
multilateral treaties were expected to provide solutions to environmental problems and 
result in healthier rivers, what was actually observed was no improvement in the condition 
of rivers. It appears that the number of treaties signed by states sharing a river cannot be 
taken as an indication of efforts to  mitigate environmental issues. The following are some 
possible explanations.
The positive correlation between treaty robustness and river degradation scores 
raises a number of interesting questions (figure 4.7). One possible reading of this situation is 
that treaties and regimes are response mechanisms as identified in the DPSIR framework. In 
that case, the data could be interpreted as showing actors within river basins w ith declining 
environmental conditions who are working together to  develop solutions but not enough 
time has passed to see the impacts of these efforts. An alternative reading o f this data could 
be that treaties actually facilitate the decline of river health. It is possible to reach this 
conclusion if the purpose of treaties and institutions is understood to be to enhance 
cooperation between states in order for them to reach their respective interests which are 
not necessarily about environmental protection. In fact, while language may exist in the 
agreements expressing support for environmental protection, the purpose of the treaties 
may actually to be to facilitate further development. Addressing these two possible 
interpretations requires a finer grained temporal aspect than what was included in this 
study or detailed case studies but is an important piece of work for Institutionalists to 
pursue. As more global analysis of environmental conditions begins to  emerge it is 
important for those studying the effectiveness of treaties and regimes to move beyond
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actor actions and look at environmental impacts. For the current study however, the 
suggestion by Institutionalists that socially constructed solutions to river degradation will 
emerge does not seem to be supported by this evidence.
What was supported by the evidence was hypothesis 9 predicting that population 
density would be positively related to the river degradation score. This was the most 
significant relationship found in the study and is partially supported by the Bio­
environmentalists' perspective that environmental decline is largely a factor of the number 
of people found in a given area. There were some exceptions to  the pattern. Firstly, there 
were a few large outliers in this particular test w ith the Han and the Ganges being densely 
populated basins that have slightly lower river degradation scores than some of the more 
heavily impacted rivers o f Europe such as the Danube and the Elbe or the Jordon from the 
Middle East. While neither the Han nor the Ganges could be argued to be in good condition 
it would seem that it is possible that it is not strictly the number of people in a basin but the 
type of activities they engage in that influence the condition of the river. Both the Han and 
Ganges areas support agrarian systems with lower levels o f industrialization compared to 
many of the more impacted rivers. As the communities in these rivers continue to 
industrialize it will be interesting to see if the condition of these rivers declines or if there is 
something special about the relationship of these communities with their river that means 
they put more effort into protecting it.
The other group o f river basins that is interesting to look at are those systems with 
low population density but high impacts. The group here includes rivers such as the 
Guadiana, Douro and the Ebro. In these systems it is clear that sustainability of river health
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was not the priority. Given that these rivers are shared it raises the question of whether 
there is an agreement between the nations sharing these rivers to  allow the decline of the 
environmental health of these rivers or whether the states sharing these rivers are, on the 
contrary, attempting to  coordinate action to address these declining conditions. Looking at 
Figure 4.9 it can be seen that the Douro and the Guadiana score quite high on the treaty 
robustness criteria while the Ebro scored a good deal lower. At the same tim e all three of 
these river systems score quite high in terms of the gross income basin despite their low 
population density. It appears the countries involved have chosen high levels of economic 
development w ithout prioritizing river health. However, in tw o o f the cases states seem to 
have coordinated in this pursuit while in the case o f the Ebro there seems to  be less 
cooperation as looking at figure 4.9 the Ebro has a much lower treaty robustness score. 
There may be some inconsistency in addressing issues o f sustainability across basins that is 
not explained by the indirect drivers explored in this thesis. While it is unfortunate that 
there were no rivers in this sample that were both in good condition and home to a large 
number of people it does seem there is a range of possibility in how many people can 
inhabit a highly impacted river. The ability of highly impacted rivers to  support large 
numbers of people suggests that for those trying to protect international rivers one strategy 
may be to encourage settlement in already impacted international river systems and 
limiting settlement in shared rivers that are in better condition.
On the whole when it comes to the conditions of international river basins the 
evidence examined in this thesis seems to be supportive o f certain elements o f the bio­
environmentalist perspective and less supportive of certain ideas in the other perspectives
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that play an important role in the Green Theory discussion and some evidence that was 
contrary to the theories explored. The implication for approaching IR from  a Green 
perspective is that the material issue of population plays an important role in understanding 
river degradation and efforts to enable cooperation through treaties and institutions have 
not yet been able effect a relative improvement in the rivers condition.
Focusing at the inter-state level and analyzing transboundary rivers ignores the 
condition of rivers in a single country. For instance the Alsek, Fraser, Nelson-Saskatchewan, 
Mississippi and the St. Lawrence river systems are all "shared" between the same two 
countries, albeit some of them to a very limited extent, but have different river degradation 
scores. This type of variation would have been missed taking a state centric approach. The 
state centric approach has also impacted how information gets reported and made available 
to the public creating additional barriers to understanding issues at an ecological level. For 
instance the approach establishing the levels of wealth w ith in basins clearly is problematic 
but given there is no global geo-referenced data on wealth this is a satisfactory approach. 
The exploration of tools such as luminosity as a means o f producing finer scale socio­
economic data has been progressing and it w ill be a useful tool to incorporate into future 
analysis. These factors may be important to account for when attempting to  deal w ith 
environmental conditions in a given river. The Green Theorists' emphasis on ecological 
limits is justified in these particular cases.
It is not clear that anything can be said in regards to the ecocentric pillar of Green 
Theory. It is apparent that humans continue to take a very utilitarian approach to 
international river basins as there are no cases in this dataset where an international river
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basin was highly populated and the river in good condition. It is also possible that in 
international rivers it is not in the short-term interests of humans to maintain healthy rivers 
decreasing child mortality, for example, appears to  be in some way linked to the increased 
destruction of rivers. If humanity is committed to  maintaining international rivers in good 
ecological condition then the case of the northern rivers is illustrative. These rivers were 
found to be in relatively better condition. They were mostly lightly populated, though not all 
the lightly populated rivers were in good ecological condition. The fact that some river 
basins with low population numbers were highly impacted indicates that other factors than 
population are at play influencing the condition of international rivers. More effort is 
needed to understand what these factors are as this study has not been able to identify a 
strong relationship between river degradation and the other variables we looked at.
With levels of participation in international regimes, agreements and institutions 
having so little  correlation with river degradation it appears that more e ffort needs to go 
into clarifying what states and other actors need to commit to beyond mechanisms of 
cooperation to ensure environmental health is maintained. The field of regime effectiveness 
explores this very question though much of the regime effectiveness research fails to link 
regimes to on the ground conditions of the environment. This thesis attempted to tie 
agreements to  actual conditions in a river basin. The relationship found was that treaties 
were linked to worsening condition. It may be possible conditions of the rivers w ill improve 
following signatures of treaties containing particular provisions but more detailed or better 
structured research is required to prove this.
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Institutions will likely remain the key means by which states try to address the 
challenge of maintaining the ecological health o f their shared rivers but mechanisms that 
facilitate cooperation may not be sufficient to  address the decline of the ecological 
condition in a given international river. Instead, when approaching the question of how to  
maintain/protect/restore the health of a given international river, explicit decisions about 
what sort of development all parties want to see in a river need to be made. Agreements 
that require such explicit decisions may prove to be very difficult to achieve as states may 
be agreeing to  constrain or regulate industrialization w ith in a given river basin. None of the 
treaties reviewed as part of this thesis when developing the treaty robustness indicator 
contained language that outlined how to constrain development paths taken. The Mekong 
and Nile agreements may be contemporary examples o f how to  achieve an agreement w ith 
these constraints for the purpose of maintaining the ecological condition of rivers however 
these agreements were too recent to include in this study as the data used to determine the 
condition of river basins predates these treaties.
As the authors of these new agreements attem pt to develop treaties that maintain 
the ecological conditions of their respective rivers, it is timely that the information needed 
to begin to conduct explorations of the impacts o f previous human actions on the 
degradation of rivers across a large number o f cases is becoming available. If students 
working on issues of international cooperation want to be able to  make suggestions that are 
relevant to this new emerging priority o f society then it will be necessary to look beyond 
aspects of inter-state cooperation and conflict and begin studying indirect and direct drivers 
of environmental change. To do this requires building o f new approaches o f the sort o f data
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explored in this thesis. The next section concludes and addresses some of the additional 
questions that have arisen out of this work.
5.2 Conclusion
This thesis has explored factors related to the environmental condition of 
international rivers through the lens o f Green Theory. W ithin the field of IR, Green Theory is 
an emerging theoretical framework that differs significantly from more traditional 
approaches such as realism, liberalism and constructivism. Currently, the more traditional IR 
approaches focus on conflict and cooperation between states. Approaching the problem 
applying Green Theory forces a focus on the environmental condition of rivers and what 
factors may be driving the decline o f river health.
Given the complex relationship that humanity has with rivers, the attem pt to isolate 
factors that lead to river degradation has produced a broad range of possible explanations. 
In this thesis, we have tested some of the possible explanations provided by Green Theory. 
The tests shed some light on the connection between ideas found in the theoretical 
literature from green worldviews such as Market Liberals, Social Greens, Institutionalists 
and Bio-environmentalists, and the quantitative indicators of river degradation at the basin 
scale. This research represents an early and rare example o f cross sectional statistical 
analysis performed on a global scale, using concepts that, to date, have mostly been 
explored in case studies settings only.
Out of the nine hypotheses used to test the links between large scale human 
behaviour (referred to as drivers) and river degradation, three relationships produced 
statistically significant results: positive correlation between river degradation score and
75
gross income; positive correlation between river degradation score and population density; 
and positive correlation between river degradation score and treaty robustness.
Given the existing theoretical literature both the gross income and treaty robustness 
did not behave as predicted. The Market Liberal literature suggests there should be a non­
linear inverted U type relationship between gross income and river degradation where a 
river starts out healthy becomes degraded and then returns to a healthy state as more 
investment flows into maintaining a healthy river. As for treaty robustness the 
Institutionalist literature indicated that there should be a negative relationship between 
treaty robustness and the river degradation score. Our findings suggest that treaty 
robustness was related to the river degradation in a positive way. This could either because 
institutions are a response to river degradation or because institutions enable activities that 
cause river degradation.
The relationship between population density and the river degradation score did 
behave exactly as suggested in the Bioenvironmentalist literature which is to  say the 
degradation increased as population density increased. A fourth relationship to emerge was 
the negative relationship between river degradation score and child mortality. Other 
relationships, based on the worldviews of Social Greens and Market Liberals, failed to 
produce significant results which indicates that, based on the indicators and information 
utilized in this thesis, they do not provide strong explanations of river degradation in 
international river basins. On the whole, the evidence supported a bio-environmentalist
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perspective. Being able to provide a quantitative statistical support to the bio­
environmentalist theoretical worldview is one o f the main contributions of this thesis.
This thesis has indeed outlined useful methods to explore possible drivers affecting 
the environmental degradation of international rivers condition. By combining the drivers, 
pressures, stressors, impacts and response framework w ith the theoretical concepts of 
Green Theory, this thesis established a new approach to  test a range of possible hypotheses 
that, to date, have only been explored as theoretical arguments or as case studies. This 
thesis was greatly aided by the new information being made available by remote sensing 
technologies that allow the global collection of data outside o f state reporting structures. 
Vorosmarty's (2010) work is the first global picture of the degradation of river basins. 
Vorosmarty's work needs to be repeated on a regular basis in order to capture temporal 
change. Creating such a dataset would allow before and after analysis of events such as the 
signing of basin level treaties. Vorosmarty's (2010) work provided an excellent opportunity 
to empirically explore, at a global scale, theoretical suppositions, such as the linkage 
between the degradation of international rivers and institutions, for the first time. This 
novel approach of combining remote sensing information with demographic information 
produced support for the Bio-environmentalist perspective. This perspective should be 
explored in greater details.
The thesis also identified a possible negative relationship between child mortality and 
the river degradation score that has serious implications for Green Theorists who argue for 
maintaining rivers in good environmental condition. The already mentioned relationship
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between river basin institutions and river health is supportive of efforts spent building river 
basin institutions. Approaches similar to this thesis should be implemented in the emerging 
Green Theory research as it provides a strong way of developing evidence fo r different 
worldviews within the theoretical framework.
Finally, we need to recognize that, given the preliminary nature o f this research, more 
refined quantitative studies need to be performed to test the theories emerging from  the 
four worldviews discussed in this thesis. For instance, this research could be improved by 
including additional indicators to better capture the aspects of the Social Green and Market 
Liberal worldviews. For example, indicators that may be better suited to capturing aspects 
of a Market Liberal worldview include; purchasing power parity adjusted GDP, Net National 
Income or Sustainable National Income. As for the Social Green perspective indicators such 
as the GINI coefficient or Theil's T Statistic are worth testing against the condition o f 
international rivers as are concepts such as levels of education, whether the basin is located 
in a developed or developing country and levels of technology use.
Questions that emerge from this study that do not fall within the purview of Green 
Theory are the difference in river degradation between the international and domestic 
basins, and the difference between rivers shared by democratic states and those shared by 
non-democratic states, to mention only a couple important questions that are left to 
explore. This thesis has outlined how such theoretical questions can be linked to physical 
conditions in rivers around the world using the DPSIR framework informed by new remote 
sensing data. Such an approach can help others delve further into the causes of river 
degradation and perhaps reverse them.
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Appendix 1
Complete Dataset for each o f the 111 Basins
Basin BTIB PIEGB G ovEff PB CB GIB VAB CM B TRB PDB
Alsek 0 .1 5 0 .8 3 1 .91 1 .6 0 1 .92 l.E + 0 7 9 7 .0 0 6 6 .1 8 6 .0 0 0 .0 2
A m azon 0 .3 7 NA -0 .2 9 -0 .1 1 -0 .2 1 l.E + 1 1 4 8 .6 1 3 7 1 .4 1 1 2 .0 0 4 .0 0
A m u r 0 .57S -0 .0 3 -0 .5 7 -0 .5 5 -0 .3 3 3 .E + 11 1 4 .5 2 2 0 6 .7 8 1 1 .0 0 3 1 .0 0
A trak 0 .7 7 -0 .3 4 -0 .9 0 -1 .8 1 -0 .7 7 l .E + 1 0 1 8 .5 1 5 4 2 .5 2 6 .0 0 3 2 .0 0
Aw ash 0 .6 7 -0 .3 2 -1 .0 1 -0 .9 5 -0 .7 2 7 .E + 09 1 8 .0 2 1 2 4 8 .0 6 0 .0 0 9 0 .0 0
Bakker 0 .3 7 0 .1 2 0 .5 8 0 .8 6 0 .6 0 2 .E + 08 7 2 .5 7 1 4 5 .8 5 6 .0 0 0 .6 5
Baraka 0 .5 4 -0 .6 0 -1 .1 0 -1 .2 0 -0 .1 0 2.E +09 1 1 .0 5 6 9 8 .6 8 0 .0 0 2 9 .0 0
Buzi 0 .5 7 -0 .1 9 -0 .5 9 -0 .8 1 -0 .6 7 l.E + 0 9 3 5 .8 3 1 1 4 1 .6 0 0 .0 0 3 1 .0 0
Ca 0 .5 8 -0 .2 3 -0 .6 2 -1 .1 1 -0 .7 0 7.E +09 1 3 .0 3 4 5 3 .5 3 6 .0 0 1 2 0 .0 0
C ata tu m b o 0 .7 0 -0 .2 0 -0 .5 2 -0 .1 3 -0 .4 7 8.E +09 3 3 .3 4 2 3 6 .3 7 6 .0 0 4 2 .0 0
Cavally 0 .5 2 -0 .5 3 -1 .1 8 -0 .9 8 -0 .9 4 l.E + 0 8 1 0 .8 9 1 3 3 2 .5 3 0 .0 0 2 1 .0 0
Coco 0 .5 2 -0 .3 3 -0 .5 9 -0 .2 2 -0 .9 3 2 .E +09 4 4 .0 9 3 8 9 .5 3 6 .0 0 2 7 .0 0
Colorado 0 .7 9 0 .4 4 1 .04 1 .0 0 0 .7 0 2.E +11 8 8 .4 4 6 8 .5 9 1 9 .0 0 1 3 .0 0
C olum bia 0 .7 6 0 .8 3 1 .91 1 .6 0 1 .9 2 2.E +11 9 0 .5 2 5 9 .0 0 1 4 .0 0 1 0 .0 0
Congo 0 .4 8 0 .1 6 -0 .9 7 -0 .9 8 -1 .0 0 6 .E +10 5 .8 6 1 2 4 1 .3 1 0 .0 0 1 7 .0 0
C orantijn 0 .1 7 NA -0 .1 1 -0 .1 5 0 .1 0 2.E +07 6 4 .8 4 4 1 0 .5 1 6 .0 0 1 .2 2
Cross 0 .6 4 -0 .3 2 -0 .8 1 -0 .6 8 -1 .0 9 7 .E +09 2 6 .2 8 8 9 6 .4 5 0 .0 0 1 9 0 .0 0
Danube 0 .9 1 0 .1 5 0 .4 5 0 .4 9 0 .3 2 9 .E +11 7 1 .5 5 1 2 7 .3 8 6 0 .0 0 1 0 0 .0 0
Daugava 0 .6 8 -0 .2 6 -0 .2 5 -0 .1 8 -0 .3 9 l.E + 1 0 3 3 .0 1 1 7 4 .3 4 1 4 .0 0 2 5 .0 0
D n iep er 0 .8 5 -0 .4 6 -0 .7 0 -0 .9 3 -0 .8 5 l.E + 1 1 2 1 .1 3 1 7 2 .8 4 2 5 .0 0 6 0 .0 0
D n iester 0 .8 9 0 .1 5 -0 .02 0 .1 8 -0 .1 0 2 .E +10 3 9 .4 6 1 9 5 .2 6 3 2 .0 0 9 4 .0 0
Don 0 .8 5 -0 .3 9 -0 .72 -0 .5 3 -1 .0 2 l.E + 1 1 4 5 .9 8 1 8 5 .2 3 2 6 .0 0 4 0 .0 0
D ouro 0 .9 5 0 .6 1 1 .41 1 .1 2 1 .2 6 9 .E + 10 8 8 .4 6 4 3 .8 4 2 5 .0 0 4 2 .0 0
Dra 0 .6 8 0 .2 3 -0 .5 0 -0 .3 8 -0 .4 9 3 .E +09 3 7 .8 0 3 8 6 .3 1 0 .0 0 1 4 .0 0
Ebro 0 .9 4 1 .0 0 1 .63 1 .1 6 1 .3 4 6 .E +10 8 8 .2 2 4 0 .0 0 1 8 .0 0 3 2 .0 0
Elbe 0 .9 8 0 .8 4 1 .31 1 .1 6 1 .15 5 .E +11 8 5 .0 2 5 0 .0 7 2 7 .0 0 1 7 0 .0 0
Essequibo 0 .2 9 NA -0 .3 1 -0 .0 7 -0 .2 9 9 .E +08 6 1 .3 5 4 7 9 .0 8 6 .0 0 3 .0 0
Fly 0 .3 8 0 .0 4 -0 .3 7 -0 .3 7 -0 .8 5 7 .E +08 4 8 .1 2 6 8 2 .3 6 7 .0 0 4 .0 0
Fraser 0 .5 1 0 .8 3 1.91 1 .6 0 1 .92 3 .E +10 9 6 .9 7 4 3 .0 2 6 .0 0 5 .0 0
G am bia 0 .5 5 -0 .1 8 -0 .4 8 -0 .3 7 -0 .4 4 2.E +09 3 3 .4 6 9 9 0 .4 1 1 0 .0 0 2 3 .0 0
G anges 0 .8 2 -0 .2 5 -0 .0 9 -0 .4 4 -0 .3 5 l.E + 1 2 0 .0 0 7 6 8 .5 8 3 0 .0 0 3 6 0 .0 0
G aro n ne 0 .9 2 1 .0 0 1.63 1 .1 6 1 .3 5 9 .E + 10 8 4 .0 2 4 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 6 3 .0 0
Grija lza 0 .7 0 -0 .2 8 -0 .1 6 0 .0 9 -0 .4 6 4 .E + 10 4 8 .5 4 3 4 9 .3 5 1 0 .0 0 5 6 .0 0
G uadiana 0 .9 5 0 .6 1 1 .41 1 .1 2 1 .2 6 5.E +10 8 8 .1 7 4 3 .5 6 2 8 .0 0 2 2 .0 0
Han 0 .8 1 -0 .2 2 -0 .5 9 -0 .8 4 -0 .7 6 8.E +09 0 .0 0 9 9 .5 8 6 .0 0 5 4 0 .0 0
H arU sN ar 0 .3 7 0 .1 9 -0 .3 6 -0 .3 2 0 .1 0 4 .E + 08 5 8 .7 2 5 2 3 .2 3 1 1 .0 0 0 .0 0
H e lm an d 0 .6 9 NA -1 .1 2 -1 .5 5 -1 .1 1 6 .E + 09 4 .0 6 1 6 1 9 .6 2 6 .0 0 2 2 .0 0
Hsi 0 .8 5 -0 .0 3 -0 .2 6 -0 .5 3 -0 .4 3 3.E +11 1 3 .0 0 5 3 0 .7 7 6 .0 0 2 0 0 .0 0
lli 0 .7 4 -0 .6 3 -0 .4 5 -0 .3 4 -0 .6 8 2.E +10 1 8 .5 3 6 0 2 .1 8 0 .0 0 2 6 .0 0
Incom ati 0 .7 8 -0 .22 -0 .1 5 -0 .0 3 -0 .0 2 9 .E + 09 5 1 .8 0 6 5 4 .0 7 1 7 .0 0 4 2 .0 0
Indus 0 .8 0 NA -0 .7 2 -0 .7 8 -0 .7 8 4.E +11 2 7 .7 4 8 3 2 .5 4 6 .0 0 1 7 6 .0 0
Irraw ad d y 0 .6 4 -0 .3 2 -0 .4 7 -0 .8 2 -0 .6 4 8.E +10 1 .4 9 7 5 8 .0 2 6 .0 0 7 6 .0 0
Jordon 0 .9 7 0 .1 1 0 .0 0 -0 .0 6 -0 .0 6 2.E +10 3 8 .1 1 2 5 6 .8 1 2 1 .0 0 1 8 0 .0 0
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Juba
Shibeli
0 .6 4 -0 .3 9 -1 .2 4 -1 .3 3 -1 .0 8 7.E +09 5 .7 7 1 1 0 8 .0 5 0 .0 0 1 8 .0 0
Kaladan 0 .4 6 -0 .4 3 -0 .62 -1 .0 0 -0 .8 8 4 .E + 08 1 .2 1 6 5 9 .6 4 6 .0 0 3 1 .0 0
Kemi 0 .5 0 0 .7 0 1.11 0 .7 9 1 .3 0 2.E +09 9 8 .1 3 4 2 .9 6 1 8 .0 0 1 .0 0
Karalven 0 .6 3 1 .0 8 1.94 1.23 2 .34 2 .E +10 9 8 .9 1 3 1 .8 5 1 8 .0 0 2 2 .0 0
Kom oe 0 .6 9 0 .1 5 -0 .5 9 -0 .2 2 -0 .3 9 3 .E + 09 2 0 .0 2 1 1 2 9 .3 7 0 .0 0 2 5 .0 0
Kunene 0 .5 3 -0 .7 5 -0 .65 -0 .7 8 -0 .5 3 2.E +09 8 .5 5 1 1 9 3 .6 4 7 .0 0 1 0 .0 0
KuraAraks 0 .8 8 0 .8 1 1 .74 1 .63 1.75 8 .E + 10 2 9 .5 8 5 0 3 .9 6 1 8 .0 0 6 9 .0 0
La Plata 0 .6 4 0 .0 2 -0 .2 0 0 .1 2 -0 .2 6 4 .E + 11 5 2 .0 3 2 4 2 .9 3 2 7 .0 0 2 0 .0 0
Lagoon
M irim
0 .6 0 0 .0 1 0 .2 4 0 .5 2 0 .3 7 4 .E + 09 6 1 .6 1 1 5 9 .0 9 1 5 .0 0 6 .0 0
Lake Chad 0 .5 8 -0 .3 2 -1 .01 -0 .9 5 -0 .9 3 3 .E + 10 2 4 .0 7 1 2 3 4 .6 7 3 .0 0 1 6 .0 0
Lake
Turkana
0 .6 0 -0 .1 9 -0 .7 6 -0 .7 1 -0 .7 8 l.E + 1 0 1 8 .9 7 9 3 8 .7 4 0 .0 0 7 3 .0 0
Lim popo 0 .8 1 -0 .1 4 0 .0 0 -0 .1 1 -0 .0 2 l.E + 1 1 6 6 .2 3 6 4 8 .3 9 1 .0 0 2 8 .0 0
M a 0 .6 0 -0 .2 3 -0 .62 -1 .1 1 -0 .7 0 l.E + 1 0 1 3 .1 0 5 7 5 .5 6 6 .0 0 8 1 .0 0
M a p u to 0 .8 4 -0 .2 2 -0 .15 -0 .0 3 -0 .0 2 5 .E + 09 2 9 .8 6 7 5 1 .0 5 9 .0 0 4 3 .0 0
M aritsa 0 .9 0 0 .2 3 0 .1 8 0 .4 5 0 .0 7 2 .E +10 5 6 .7 6 1 9 4 .01 1 9 .0 0 6 1 .0 0
M a ro n i 0 .2 4 NA -0 .0 7 -0 .1 4 0 .2 1 l.E + 0 6 5 9 .4 1 3 1 0 .0 0 6 .0 0 0 .1 7
M ek o n g 0 .7 3 -0 .3 1 -0 .4 0 -0 .4 6 -0 .5 2 2.E +11 3 7 .7 1 7 0 9 .0 8 2 1 .0 0 7 1 .0 0
Mississippi 0 .9 0 0 .4 4 -0 .4 0 1 .6 0 1.92 2.E +12 9 0 .0 0 7 4 .4 7 1 0 .0 0 2 2 .0 0
Narva 0 .5 7 0 .0 3 -0 .0 8 -0 .0 4 -0 .2 7 9 .E + 09 5 7 .5 1 1 5 3 .5 9 1 8 .0 0 1 5 .0 0
Nelson 0 .7 3 0 .8 3 1.91 1 .6 0 1.92 l.E + 1 1 9 6 .0 8 6 4 .8 4 6 .0 0 4 .0 0
N em an 0 .8 3 -0 .1 0 -0 .0 9 -0 .0 2 -0 .2 2 3 .E + 10 4 4 .8 3 1 3 0 .01 2 3 .0 0 5 2 .0 0
N iger 0 .7 3 -0 .1 0 -0 .8 5 -0 .5 9 -0 .7 6 6 .E +10 3 1 .8 9 1 1 7 8 .8 1 1 5 .0 0 3 9 .0 0
Nile 0 .6 3 -0 .0 7 -0 .7 9 -0 .8 8 -0 .7 1 5 .E + 11 1 7 .0 5 8 0 4 .9 2 1 7 .0 0 5 3 .0 0
N te m 0 .4 7 NA -0 .9 4 -0 .8 2 0 .2 4 2 .E +09 1 4 .4 1 9 1 3 .9 7 0 .0 0 1 1 .0 0
Ob 0 .5 7 -0 .0 1 -0 .45 -0 .3 9 -0 .1 9 2.E +11 3 1 .2 7 2 0 9 .8 7 1 3 .0 0 9 .0 0
O der 0 .9 1 0 .7 9 1 .0 8 1 .0 1 0 .8 7 2 .E +10 8 1 .0 3 7 6 .7 5 3 3 .0 0 1 4 0 .0 0
O gooue 0 .3 3 NA -1 .03 -0 .9 2 -1 .0 2 3 .E + 09 3 6 .0 0 6 2 3 .5 7 0 .0 0 3 .0 0
O kavango 0 .4 8 -0 .5 2 -0 .6 8 -1 .0 0 -0 .6 6 3 .E + 09 2 9 .6 9 9 6 7 .4 9 1 .0 0 1 .0 0
Olanga 0 .4 5 0 .5 6 0 .7 3 0 .6 9 0 .8 1 8 .E + 08 4 9 .9 6 1 3 9 .8 2 1 9 .0 0 4 .0 0
Oral 0 .6 6 -0 .3 0 -0 .7 0 -0 .5 6 -0 .0 5 2 .E +10 3 1 .3 0 3 1 6 .5 0 1 3 .0 0 1 0 .0 0
O range 0 .8 5 -0 .2 1 0 .3 0 0 .2 6 0 .4 0 3 .E + 11 6 7 .5 3 5 9 4 .8 5 9 .0 0 1 4 .0 0
O rinoco 0 .4 9 -0 .2 0 -0 .52 -0 .1 3 -0 .4 7 6 .E +10 4 3 .8 0 2 2 2 .7 2 6 .0 0 1 1 .0 0
O u e m e 0 .7 1 -0 .0 8 -0 .82 -0 .5 4 -0 .7 6 4 .E + 09 5 3 .8 4 1 0 1 5 .8 6 1 .0 0 8 6 .0 0
Oulu 0 .4 9 0 .5 6 0 .73 0 .6 9 0 .8 1 5 .E + 09 9 7 .1 2 4 3 .0 7 1 8 .0 0 9 .0 0
Po 0 .9 1 0 .8 2 1 .64 1 .3 1 1 .55 4 .E + 11 8 0 .2 6 4 9 .9 6 1 7 .0 0 2 0 0 .0 0
Red 0 .7 8 -0 .1 9 -0 .4 4 -0 .8 5 -0 .5 5 7 .E + 10 1 3 .0 0 6 5 9 .8 2 6 .0 0 1 8 0 .0 0
Rhine 0 .9 5 0 .9 5 1 .79 1 .5 0 1 .7 0 l.E + 1 3 9 0 .8 1 4 8 .5 6 5 2 .0 0 3 1 0 .0 0
Rhone 0 .8 9 0 .7 6 1.51 1.21 1 .4 1 3 .E + 11 8 5 .3 8 4 0 .7 6 2 6 .0 0 9 8 .0 0
Rio G rande 0 .8 5 0 .4 4 1.04 1 .0 0 0 .7 0 2 .E + 11 6 5 .3 8 1 5 3 .3 0 1 6 .0 0 1 8 .0 0
Ruvum a 0 .4 2 -0 .2 7 -0 .42 -0 .2 1 -0 .6 8 l.E + 0 9 3 7 .7 8 1 3 0 4 .6 7 1 .0 0 1 2 .0 0
Sabi 0 .7 1 -0 .1 9 -0 .59 -0 .8 1 -0 .6 7 7 .E + 09 1 8 .5 5 7 7 9 .3 2 1 .0 0 2 8 .0 0
Saigon 0 .7 7 -0 .4 9 -0 .63 -0 .4 5 -0 .7 3 l .E + 1 0 1 3 .0 0 2 5 5 .2 7 6 .0 0 2 3 0 .0 0
S alw een 0 .6 0 -0 .0 3 0 .03 0 .0 5 -0 .1 9 5 .E + 10 1 5 .9 1 7 7 2 .0 9 6 .0 0 2 0 .0 0
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San Juan 0.60 0.12 -0.19 0.23 -0.12 9.E+09 45.83 254.90 6.00 65.00
Sassandra 0.63 -0.42 -0.85 -0.58 -0.72 3.E+08 11.30 1168.49 0.00 47.00
Seine 0.95 1.10 1.88 1.45 1.79 3.E+10 84.07 47.31 18.00 190.00
Senegal 0.59 -0.24 -0.50 -0.32 -0.44 5.E+09 31.30 1201.84 12.00 10.00
Sepik 0.46 0.04 -0.37 -0.37 -0.85 2.E+09 48.85 683.01 7.00 11.00
St. John 0.62 0.83 1.91 1.60 1.92 l.E+10 95.86 54.94 16.00 8.00
St.
Lawrence
0.75 0.83 1.91 1.60 1.92 l.E+12 92.64 59.95 26.00 43.00
Stikine 0.15 0.83 1.91 1.60 1.92 5.E+07 90.00 43.34 6.00 0.04
Tagus 0.96 0.61 1.41 1.12 1.26 2.E+11 88.35 44.34 25.00 120.00
Tami 0.49 0.04 -0.37 -0.37 -0.85 9.E+08 37.40 387.85 6.00 4.00
Tamir 0.69 NA -0.95 -0.90 -0.95 3.E+10 13.01 554.11 6.00 8.00
Terek 0.69 NA -0.70 -0.47 0.60 2.E+09 34.02 197.50 18.00 60.00
Tigris 0.90 -0.38 -0.61 -0.78 -0.62 2.E+11 12.66 688.76 6.00 61.00
Torne 0.41 1.09 2.00 1.45 2.42 2.E+09 99.30 33.71 21.00 2.00
Tuloma 0.46 0.56 0.73 0.69 0.81 3.E+09 34.06 136.14 18.00 16.00
Tumen 0.72 -0.30 -0.90 -1.02 -0.37 6.E+09 9.42 195.13 6.00 74.00
UbsaNura 0.36 0.35 -0.49 -0.31 0.27 3.E+08 54.92 488.06 7.00 0.00
Vistula 0.91 0.09 0.08 -0.08 -0.19 2.E+11 75.69 90.34 21.00 110.00
Volga 0.80 -0.40 -0.68 -0.95 -0.84 4.E+11 33.99 176.35 20.00 38.00
Volta 0.75 0.15 -0.64 -0.29 -0.46 3.E+10 42.15 925.14 0.00 49.00
Vuoska 0.59 0.56 0.73 0.69 0.81 2.E+10 97.81 128.56 20.00 8.00
Yalu 0.74 -0.45 -1.01 -1.27 -1.02 l.E+10 7.41 274.51 6.00 110.00
Yenisay 0.35 0.34 -0.49 -0.31 0.27 5.E+10 28.51 276.13 7.00 3.00
Yukon 0.26 0.83 1.91 1.60 1.92 4.E+09 90.63 63.29 6.00 0.13
Zambezi 0.59 0.03 -0.62 -0.60 -0.59 3.E+10 34.24 1059.08 9.00 21.00
81
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